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LOSING THE WAR AGAINST DIRTY MONEY:
RETHINKING GLOBAL STANDARDS ON
PREVENTING MONEY LAill~DERING AND
TERRORISM FINANCING
RICHARD K. GORDON'

"We must now wage an all-out war to prevent money laundering and
1
the financing of terrorism. "
"One and one is two.
Two and two is four.
I feel so bad
2
'Cause I'm losing the war."

INTRODUCTION

Since at least the 1970s, there has been a sustained and increasingly
global interest in stopping money laundering. 3 The reasons are hardly
© 2011 Richard K. Gordon.
' Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law; Adjunct Associate Professor of
International Studies, Brown University. B.A. Yale (1978), J.D. Harvard Law School (1984). From
1994 through 2004 the author served as a senior staff member of the International Monetary Fund
where he worked, among other things, on the development and implementation of global standards for
the prevention of money laundering and terrorism financing. The views expressed in the Article are the
author's alone and should not be attributable to the International Monetary Fund. Thanks to Jonathan
Adler, Craig Boise, David Chaikin, Graeme Cooper, Erik Jensen, Peter Gerhart, Willie Maddox,
Richard Vann, Alvin Warren, Mira Kasliwal, and Emile van de Does de Willebois.
I. Jochen Sanio, President, Financial Action Task Force and President, Federal Banking
Supervisory Office, Federal Republic of Germany, Washington D.C., August 8, 2002.
2. Mel Brooks, The Producers (1968).
3. For example, the first anti-money laundering law enacted in the U.S. was The Currency and
Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970 (Bank Secrecy Act) P.L. 91-508, Titles I and II (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b, 1951-59 (2000) and 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5330 (2000) [hereinafter
Currency Reporting Act]). Anti-money laundering laws were expanded in 1986, 88, 92, 94, 96, 2001,
and 2004. FinCEN, HistOIJ' of Anti-money Laundering Laws, http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/
aml_history.html (FinCEN is the U.S. financial intelligence Unit). See Mariano-Florentino Cuellar,
Criminal Law: The Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight Against A1oney Laundering 01_1d the
Dis111ptian of Criminal Finance, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 311, 336-64 (2003) [heremafter
Cuellar, Criminal Lmv]. The European Union's efforts began in 1991 with its first anti-money
laundering Directive (Council Directive 911308/EEC, 1991 O.J. (L 166) (EC)) and were expanded
significantly with the second and third anti-money laundering Directives in 2001 (Council Directive
2001/97/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 344) (EC)) and 2004 (Council Directive 2005/60/EC, 2005 0.1. (L 309)
(EC)). See Alan E. Sorcher, Lost In Implementation: Financial Institutions Face Challenges Complying
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complex. Law enforcement may be able to follow a money trail of criminal
proceeds to find the perpetrator or use the proceeds as evidence in a
prosecution. 4 The state may also be able to confiscate the ill-gotten gains. 5
Criminals, therefore, seek to disguise the illegal origins of the proceeds of
crime and their ownership of the proceeds. 6 At least in theory, preventing

With Anti-lvfoney Laundering Lmvs, 18 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 395, 408-10, 414 (2005) [hereinafter
Sorcher; Lost In Implementation]. The first multilateral convention including anti-money laundering
provisions came into force in 1988. United Nations Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N. T.S. 95, available at http://
www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. This was followed by
conventions expanding anti-money laundering provisions. The Council of Europe Convention on
Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime ETS No. 141 (entered into
force 1993 ), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Htrnl/14l.htm [hereinafter
Strasbourg Convention]; United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Sept. 29,
2003, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209, available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/
TOC%20Convention/T0Cebook-e.pdf. The Financial Action Task Force published its first set of 40
Recommendations on money laundering in 1990. These original Recommendations were revised and
expanded in 1996. FINANCIAl. ACTION TASK FORCE FOI<TY RECOMMENDATIONS ON MONEY
LAUNDERING 2 (June 28, 1996). A revised version was issued in 2003, available at http://www.fatfgafi.org/document/28/0,3746,en_32250379 _32236920_33658140_1_1_1_1 ,OO.html [hereinafter FATF
40 Recommendations]. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001 the FATF added 8 Special
Recommendations against Terrorism Finance; a 9th Recommendation was added in 2004. FATF,
Terrorist Financing, available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,3417,en_322503 79 _32236947
_1_1_1_1_1 ,OO.htm1 [hereinafter IX Special Reconunendations].
4. Large amounts of cash can be bulky, hard to move, and draw the attention of law enforcement,
Richard Gordon, T1ysts or Terrorists? Financial Institutions and the Search for Bad Guys, 43 WAXE
FOREST L. REv. 699, 708-09 (2008) [hereinafter Gordon, T1ysts or Terrorists], while checks, credit
cards, etc., can create a financial trail linking funds to the person(s) making the payment. ROGER C.
MOLANDER, B. DAVID MUSSINGTON & PETER A. WILSON, CYBERPAYMENTS AND MONEY
LAUNDERING (1998).
5. For a history of forfeih1re laws in the U.S., see David J. Fried, Criminal Lmv: Rationalizing
Criminal FO!feiture, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 328,335-57 (1988) and Barclay Thomas Johnson,
Restoring Civility-the Civil Asset Fol}eiture Reji:mn Act of 2000: Baby Steps Towards a More Civilized
Civil F01jeiture System, 35 IND. L. REV. 1045, 1047-53, 1070-73 (2001). Vienna Convention, supra
note 3, at Art. 5 (limited to the proceeds of narcotics trafficking), Strasbourg Convention, supra note 3,
at Art. 2, Palermo Convention, supra note 3, at Art. 12, and the FATF 40 Recommendations on Money
Laundering, supra note 3, at Recmm11endation 3, require the adoption of forfeiture laws for the
proceeds of crime.
6. "When a criminal activity generates substantial profits, the individual or group involved must
find a way to control the fimds without attracting attention to the underlying activity or the persons
involved ... _ In the initial -or placement -stage of money laundering, the launderer introduces his
illegal profits into the financial system . . . . After the funds have entered the financial system, the
second-or layering-stage takes place. In this phase, the launderer engages in a series of conversions
or movements of the fi.mds to distance them from their source .... Having successfully processed his
criminal profits through the first two phases the launderer then moves them to the third stage integration- in which the funds re-enter the legitimate economy." FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE,
MONEY LAUNDERING FAQ, available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/29/0,3343,en_32250379
_3223 5720 _336596 I 3_1_ I_l_ I ,OO.html.
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criminals from succeeding makes it harder for them to benefit from their
.
7
crnnes.
Over the past forty years anti-money lalmdering mles have been
expanded, refined a bit, but rarely completely re-thought or substantially
rewritten. 8 The vast majority of the world's jurisdictions now endorse the
latest version of the Financial Action Task Force's Forty Recommendations
on Money Laundering ("FATF 40 Recommendations") 9 and accompanying
Methodology for Assessment. 10 Stmiing in 1990, these global standards

7. "[T]argeting the money laundering aspect of criminal activity and depriving the criminal of his
ill-gotten gains means hitting him where he is vulnerable. Without a usable profit, the criminal activity
will not continue." I d.
8. For example, in the U.S., the first anti-money laundering rule focused on the placement stage
(the launderer introduces his illegal profits into the financial system) by requiring financial institutions
to identifY clients, keep certain client records, and report cash deposits in excess of $10,000. Bank
Secrecy Act, supra note 3. Future laws extend the definition of financial institutions, enhanced recordkeeping rules, and added a requirement to monitor client activity and report suspicious activities.
FinCEN, History of Anti-money Laundering Laws, supra note 3. Since the FATF's first set of 40
Recommendations on Money Laundering the definition of financial institution has been extended (and
certain requirements have been extended to include some persons who are not financial institutions) and
rules on record-keeping have been tightened, but the general framework of client identification,
recordkeeping, client monitoring, and reporting of suspicious activities has not changed. F ATF 40
Reconunendations (1 990) and FATF 40 Recommendations (1996), supra note 3, at Recommendations
11-15; FATF 40 Recommendations (2003), supra note 3, at Recommendations 5-16.
9. According to the FATF 130 countries have endorsed the 40. FATF 40 Recommendations,
supra note 3, at Introduction. In 2002 the International Monetary Fund [IMF] endorsed the FATF 40
Recommendations (and the FATF VIII Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing (2001), which
were amended in 2004 to include Special Recommendation IX, available at http://www.fatfgafi.org/dataoecd/8/17/34849466.pd1). INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, IMF ADVANCES EFFORTS
TO COMBAT MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCE, Public Information Notice No. 02/87,
August 8, 2002, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2002/pn0287.htm; INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND, REPORT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE FATF PLENARY MEETING AND PROPOSAL FOR
THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING COMPLIANCE WITH THE ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING AND COMBATTING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM (AML/CFT) STANDARD I (2002),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/aml/2002/eng/ll 0802.pdf. Because nearly every
country in the world is a member of the IMF this endorsement has significant resonance. IMF Members'
Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/
sec/memdir/members.htm. More importantly, each member of the F ATF and each of the eight FATF
associate members and FATF-style regional bodies has endorsed the FATF 40 Recommendations and
Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing as the global standard for anti- money laundering and
combating the financing of terrorism. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, MEMBERS AND
OBSERVERS, available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/documentl52/0,3343,en_32250379 _32236869
_34027188_1_1_1_1,00.btml (providing web links to each FATF associate member and FATF-style
regional body); see also PAUL ALLAN SCHOTT, REFERENCE GUIDE TO ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND
COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORJSM Ill-7 - III-13 (2d ed. 2006), available at
http:i/siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAML/Resources/396511-1146581427871/Reference_Guide
_AMLCFT_2ndSupplement.pdf [hereinafter SCHOTT, REFERENCE GUIDE].
10. FD,ANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING COMPLIANCE WITH THE
FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS AND FATF 9 SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS (2009), available ar
http://www .fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/16/54/403 39628 .pdf [hereinafter Methodology].
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have required financial institutions 11 to monitor the transactions of their
customers and to report to special government authorities (known as
financial intelligence units) those transactions they suspect might involve
the proceeds of crime, 12 and since 2001, the financing of tenorism. 13
Financial intelligence units then analyze the reports along with other data
and make recommendations to law enforcement as to which clients or
transactions should be investigated. 14
The tenorist attacks of September 11, 2001 greatly intensified the
global "war" on money laundering and, for the first time, on terrorism
financing. 15 In 2002, the International Monetary Fund and the World Banlc
adopted the FATF 40 Recommendations and the eight new Special
Recommendations on Terrorism Financing as a world standard. 16 They,
along with the Financial Action Task Force and various regional antimoney laundering groups, also began a joint global compliance program by
assessing the extent to which individual countries were implementing those
standards. 17 Failure to implement the standards adequately can result in a
broad application of sanctions or countermeasures, including bans on doing
business with financial institutions located within the borders of non-

11. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, REPORT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE FATF PLENARY
MEETING AND PROPOSAL FOR THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING
COMPLIANCE WITH THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM
(AMLICFT) STANDARD I (2002), available at http://www.irnf.org/external/np/mae/aml/2002/
eng/ 11 0802.pdf [hereinafter PROPOSAL FOR THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE METHODOLOGY].
12. FATF 40 Recommendations (1990) and FATF 40 Recommendations (1996), supra note 3, at
Recommendations ll-15; FATF 40 Recommendations (2003), supra note 3, at Recommendations 5-16.
13. FA TF Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing (200 I), supra note 9.
14. SCHOTT, REFERENCE GliTDE, supra note 9, at V!I-3.
15. Richard K. Gordon, 011 the Use and Abuse of Standards for Law: Global Governance and
Offihore Centers, 88 N.C. L. REV. 501, 564 (2010) [hereinafter Gordon, On the Use and Abuse of

Standards jar Law].
16. IMF ADVANCES EFFORTS TO COMBAT MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCE,
Public Information Notice No. 02/87 (August 8, 2002), available at http://www.irnf.org/external/np/sec/
pn/2002/pn0287 .htm.
17. A unitonn system of assessment, including a single assessment methodology, was agreed to
by the lfv[f, the World Bank, and the FATF in 2002. PROPOSAL FOR THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE
METHODOlOGY, supra note 11, at 2. IMF assessment reports can be found at http://www.imf.org/
external/ns/cs.aspx?id= 175 and World Banlc assessments at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNALITOPICS/EXTF!NANCIALSECTOR/EXT AMLIO,contentMDK:2199590 l-menuPK:396
518-pagePK:l48956-piPK:216618-theSitePK:396512,00.html. These bodies and each of the eight
FATF associate members and FATF-style regional bodies (many of which are undertaken with the
participation of the IMF and World Banlc) use the uniform assessment system. FA TF assessments can
be found at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,3417 ,en_32250379_32236963 _l_l_l_l_l,OO.html and
those of regional bodies can be found at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/leg/amlcft/eng/aml2
.htm#reports.
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complying jurisdictions. 18 As a result, millions of suspicious transaction
reports have been forwarded to financial intelligence units by financial
institutions throughout the world, 19 although how many have resulted in
further investigation, prosecution, and conviction is not publically
available. 20
These measures to prevent money laundering and ten·orism financing
in the financial sector have been endorsed by nearly every country in the
world. 21 The only major problem is that they do not seem to work.22 In fact,
this Article argues they cannot work, and that they need to be rethought.
The Article suggests that the long-accepted view that such a significant
amount of criminal law enforcement should be left in private hands 23 is
wrong. Instead, the government should unde1iake the key role financial
institutions cunently play in deciding if their clients are possible money
launderers or ten·01ists. The miicle also argues that financial intelligence
units should make such detenninations in ways that are analogous to how
some advanced country revenue authorities select income tax retums for
audit, particularly the United States Intemal Revenue Service. Financial
institutions, this Aliicle suggests, should be relegated to repmiing only
objective infonnation on customers and transactions in much the way that
18. For example, under Title lii, Sec. 311(a) of the U.S.A. PATRIOT ACT, Pub.L. 107-56 (2001),
31 U.S.C. § 5318A(b)(5), the Secretary of the Treasury may prohibit, or impose conditions upon, the
opening or maintaining in the United States of a correspondent account or payable· through account by
any domestic financial institution or domestic financial agency for or on behalf of a foreign banking
institution, if he determines ihat the institution is inadequately applying appropriate anti-money
laundering/terrorism financing rules. FATF Recommendation 21 states, "[f]inancial institutions should
give special attention to business relationships and transactions with persons, including companies and
financial institutions, from countries which do not or insufficiently apply the F ATF Recommendations .
. . . Where such a country continues not to apply or insufficiently applies the FATF Recommendations,
countries should be able to apply appropriate countermeasures."
19. Telephone Interview with Rick McDonnell, Staff Director, FATF, in Paris, Fr. (Feb. 28, 2010)
[hereinafter McDonnell Interview]. In the U.S. alone, depository institutions filed over 4 nullion
suspicious transaction reports between April 1996 and June 2009. The U.S. refers to suspicious
transaction reports as suspicious activity reports or SARs. FinCEN, 13 SAR Review by the Numbers,
Suspicious Activity Report FORM TD F-90-22.47, Suspicious Activity Report by Depository
Institution, Exhibit 1: Suspicious Activity Report Filings by Year & Month, April 1, 1996 through June
30, 2009 (January 2010), available at http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_by_numb _13 .pdf
[hereinafter FinCEN SAR Reviews].
20. E-mail from Boudewijn Verhelst, President, Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, to
author (Feb. 27, 2010) [hereinafter Verhelst e-mail].
21. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
22. This view has been expressed by many commentators, including governmental and private
sector practitioners and acadenlics. See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
23. For purposes of this Article "private" includes state-owned financial institutions and others
subject to preventive measures requirements. This is because state-owned persons are subject to most of
the same constraints, incentives, and disincentives with respect to those requirements as are private,
fully for-profit institutions.
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certain third parties must report taxpayer transactions to revenue
authorities.
Following a brief overview in Part I.A of the overall system to prevent
money laundering, Part I.B desc1ibes the role of the private sector, which is
to identifY customers, create a profile of their legitimate activities, keep
detailed records of clients and their transactions, monitor their transactions
to see if they confonn to their profile, examine further any unusual
transactions, and repmt to the government any suspicious transactions. Part
I.C continues the description of the preventive measures system by
describing the government's role, which is to assist the private sector in
identifying suspicious transactions, ensure compliance with the preventive
measures requirements, and analyze suspicious transaction reports to
detern1ine those that should be investigated.
Parts I.D and I.E examine the effectiveness of this system. Part I.D
discusses successes and failures in the private sector's role. Borrowing from
theory concerning the effectiveness of private sector unftmded mandates,
this Pari reviews why many aspects of the system are failing, focusing on
the subjectivity of the mandate, the disincentives to comply, and the lack of
comprehensive data on client identification and transactions. It notes that
the system includes an inherent contradiction: the public sector is tasked
with infonning the private sector how best to detect launderers and
ten·orists, but to do so could act as a road map on how to avoid detection
should such infonnation fall into the wrong hands. Pari I.D discusses how
financial institutions do not and cmmot use scientifically tested statistical
means to detennine if a particular client or set of transactions is more likely
than others to indicate criminal activity. Part I.D then turns to a discussion
of a few issues regarding the impact the system has but that are not related
to effectiveness, followed by a summary and analysis of how flaws might
be addressed.
Pari I.E continues by discussing the successes and failures in the
public sector's role. It reviews why the system is failing, focusing on the
lack of assistance to the private sector in and the lack of necessary data on
client identification and transactions. It also discusses how fmancial
intelligence units, like financial institutions, do not and cmmot use
scientifically tested statistical means to detennine probabilities of criminal
activity. Part I concludes with a summary and analysis tying both private
and public roles together.
Part II then turns to a review of certain current techniques for selecting
income tax returns for audit. After an overview of the system, Pari II first
discusses the limited role of the private sector in providing tax
administrators with infonnation, comparing this to the far greater role the

2011]

LOSING THE WAR AGAINST DIRTY MONEY

509

private sector plays in implementing preventive measures. Next, this Pmi
tums to consider how tax administrators, particularly the U.S. Internal
Revenue Service, select taxpayers for audit, comparing this to the role of
both the private and public sectors in implementing preventive measures. It
focuses on how some tax administrations use scientifically tested statistical
means to determine probabilities of tax evasion. Part II then suggests how
flaws in both private and public roles of implementing money laundeting
and terrorism financing preventive measures might be theoretically
addressed by bon-owing from the experience of tax administration. Pmi II
concludes with a shmi summary and analysis that relates these conclusions
to the preventive measures system.
Referring to the analyses in Pmis I and II, Pali III suggests changes to
the cunent preventive measures standard. It suggests that financial
intelligence units should be uniquely tasked with analyzing and selecting
clients and transactions for further investigation for money laundering and
tenmism financing. The private sector's role should be restricted to
identifying customers, creating an initial profile of their legitimate
activities, and reporting such information and all client transactions to
financial intelligence units.
I. CURRENT STANDARDS FOR PREVENTING MONEY

LAUNDERING AND TERRORISM FINANCING IN THE FINANCIAL
SECTOR
A. System Overview

The FATF's 40 Recommendations and the Special Recommendations
are designed to "provide an enhanced, comprehensive and consistent
framework of measures for combating money laundering and terrorist
financing." 24 Together they cover, among other things, the criminalization
of money laundering and tenorism financing, the freezing and seizing of
criminal proceeds and of tenorism funds, key preventive measures against
laundering and tenorism financing for financial institutions and other
institutions subject to preventive measures, financial intelligence units, and
intemational cooperation.Z 5 The 40 Recmmnendations have included
24. F ATF 40 Recommendations (2003), supra note 3, at Introduction.
25. The FATF 40 Recommendations are broken down into four groups. These are Group A: Legal
Systems, and include the scope of the criminal offence of money laundering (I and 2) and provisional
measures and confiscation (3); Group B: Measures to be taken by Financial Institutions and (certain)
Nonfinancial Businesses and Professions to Prevent Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, and
include prohibition on shell banks (4), customer due diligence and record-keeping (including client
identification and transaction monitoring) (5-12), reporting of suspicious transactions and compliance
(including internal training and audit programs)(l3-16), other measures to deter money laundering and
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similar preventive measure requirements since the original 1990 draft. 26 In
effect, these Recommendations divide the responsibility for preventing and
lmcove1ing money lanndering between the p1ivate and public sector.
B. Private Sector Role
FATF Recommendations 5 through 13 plus 21 and 22 (and the
relevant materials in the accompanying Methodology for assessment of
compliance) set out the part of the preventive measures system that applies
to the private sector. Unfommately these Recommendations are not a
model of clarity and are not easy for non-experts to comprehend. 27
However, they are designed to create a five-part requirement: 28 (1)
terrorist financing (including sanctions for failure to comply with the Recommendations) (!7-20),
measures to be taken with respect to countries that do not or insufficiently comply with the FATF
Recommendations (21-22), and regulation and supervision (23-25); Group C: Institutional and other
Measures Necessary in Systems for Combating Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, and
include competent authorities, their powers and resources (including the establishment of a financial
intelligence unit) (26-32) and transparency of legal persons and arrangements (33 and 34); and Group
D: International Co-operation, including implement various treaties (35), mutual legal assistance and
extradition (36-39), and other forms of co-operation (40). The IX Special Recommendations include
ratification and implementation of UN instruments (I), criminalizing the financing of terrorism and
associated money laundering (II), freezing and confiscating terrorist assets (III), reporting suspicious
transactions related to terrorism (also required in Recommendation 13) (IV), international co-operation,
(pay special attention to) alternative remittance systems (VI), (special rules on) wire transfers (VII),
(pay special attention to) non-profit organizations (VIII), and cash comiers (IX). FATF 40
Recommendations and IX Special Recommendations, supra note 3.
26. Since 1990 there has been a progressive expansion of those persons who must follow the
"preventive measures" provisions in the FATF 40 Recommendations. FA TF Recommendations ( 1990),
supra note 3 at Recommendation 5, FATF Recommendations ( 1996 ), supra note 3 at Recommendation
5. The current definition of financial instil1ltions includes include any person who engages in
acceptance of deposits and other repayable fi.mds from the public; lending; financial leasing; the transfer
of money or value; issuing and managing means of payment (e.g. credit and debit cards, checks,
traveler's checks, money orders and banlcers' drafts, electronic money); financial guarantees and
commitments; trading in money market instmments (checks, bills, COs, detivatives etc.), foreign
exchange, exchange, interest rate and index instruments, transferable securities, conunodity fittures
trading; participation in securities issues and the provision of financial services related to such issues;
individual and collective pmifolio management; safekeeping and administration of cash or liquid
securities on behalf of other persons; otherwise investing, administering or managing funds or money
on behalf of other persons; and underwriting and placement of life insurance and other investment
related insurance, money, and currency changing. Methodology, supra note I 0, at 65-66. Since 2003
most of the preventive measures prescribed for financial institutions have been extended to certain
designated non-financial businesses and persons, including casinos (which also includes internet
casinos), real estate agents, dealers in precious metals, dealers in precious stones, lawyers, notaries, and
other independent legal professionals and accountants, and tmst and company service providers. !d. at
62.
27. In 2002 an attempt was made by the International Monetary Fund to reorganize the preventive
measures Recommendations into a more accessible, coherent whole. However, in a series of meetings
in 2002 delegations to the FATF rejected the effort.
28. A working group consisting of the Commonwealth Secretariat, the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime, the World Bank, and the IMF has drafted a model regulation for the prevention of
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establish and maintain customer identity (including beneficial owner and
controller of the legal title holder of the account); (2) create and maintain
an up-to-date customer profile; 29 (3) monitor transactions to see if they fit
with the customer profile of transactions that are legitimate; (4) if not,
examine further any such tr·ansaction to see if it might represent the
proceeds of c1ime or financing of tenorism, including by examining the
source of funds; and (5) if so, report the transaction to the financial
intelligence unit, along with a description of why the financial institution
believes that the transaction is suspicious. 30 Recommendations 18, 19, and
26 through 34 (and the relevant mate1ials in the accompanying
Methodology for assessment of compliance) address both the supervisory
system to ensure that the private sector complies with their preventive
measures requirements and the criminal investigation and prosecution
system.
As shall be seen, the private sector's role focuses on three basic
objectives. The first is to help exclude from the financial system possible
criminal and terrorist elements. It does this by making financial institutions
and other institutions subject to preventive measures identify and profile
potential (and, periodically, existing) customers to screen out possible
criminals and tenorists. 31 The second is to make available to law
enforcement financial information that can be used in criminal
investigations or as evidence in a prosecution. It does this by requi1ing the
private sector to maintain records of the identity of all clients and their
transactions. 32 The third is to identify customers who might be criminals or
terrorists so that law enforcement can decide whether to investigate and
prosecute such persons. It does this by requiring the private sector to
monitor customer tr·ansactions based on their profiles and repmi to law

money laundering and the financing of terrorism as part of a model law on antimony laundering and
terrorism financing. The Model Regulation implements these FATF Reconm1endations based on the
regulatory frameworks in the U.K., Canada, Australia, and Hong Kong. Article 5.l(a)-(e) of the Model
Regulation outlines CDD as the "(a) identification of customers, including beneficial owners; (b)
gathering of information on customers to create a customer profile; (c) application of acceptance
policies to new customers; (d) maintenance of customer information on an ongoing basis; [and the] (e)
monitoring of customer transactions." Model Regulation (2006) (on file with the U.N Office on Dmgs
and Crime). Article 10 describes a customer profile as being "of sufficient nature and detail ... to
monitor the customer's transactions, apply enhanced customer due diligence where necessary, and
detect suspicious transactions." Jd
29. If a new customer profile suggests that the customer is opening an account with proceeds of
crime are involved the financial institution should go directly to Step 4. I d.
30. See infi·a notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
3!. See infra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
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enforcement those that raise suspicion that criminal proceeds or terrorism
financing are involved. 33
The United States largely complies with these requirements through
statutory and regulat01y measures (although it does not extend these
requirements to all those designated non-fmancial businesses and persons
as defined in the Methodology), as well as through guidance issued to
financial institutions. 34 The European Union also largely complies through
both Directives (essentially instructions to members of the Union) and
implementing legislation at the member cmmhy leve1. 35 The language used
to implement the Recommendations is often similar to that found in the
Recommendations. 36
Experience suggests that while the second objective appears to work
rather well, the first may work less well, and the third may rarely work at
all.37
1. Customer Identification, Customer Profiling, Record-Keeping
FATF Recommendation 5 requires that financial institutions identify
their customers, including the beneficial owner of a customer account,
which, in the case of legal persons (and other legal arrangements such as
trusts), includes taking "reasonable measures" to identifY the physical

33. See inji-a notes 52-64 and accompanying text.
34. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, THIRD MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT ON ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM, UNITED STATES OF ArviERICA 83-197
(financial institutions), 198-226 (designated non-financial businesses and persons) (2006), available at
http://www .fatf-gaft.org/da!aoecd/44/9/3 710 1772.pdf [hereinafter U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION
REPORT]. See also M. MAUREEN MURPHY, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: INTERNATIONAL MONEY
LAUNDERING ABATEMENT AND ANTI-TERRORISM FINANCING ACT OF 2001, available at
http://epic.org/privacy/ftnanciai/RL31208.pdf; Megan Roberts, Big Brother Isn't Just Watching You,

He's Also Wasting Your Tax Payer Dollars: An Ana~vsis of the Anti-J'vfoney Laundering Provisions of
the USA Patriot Act, 56 RUTGERS L REv. 573, 586 (2004). Regulations on customer identification are
found in 3 l C.F .R. § I 03.121. 31 U.S .C. § 5314(b) (2006) authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to
require financial institutions to report suspicious transactions. It is implemented at 21 C.F.R. § 21.110.
There are similar customer identification rules for securities broker-dealers, mutual funds, and futures
commission merchants and introducing brokers in commodities. Financial Recordkeeping and
RepOiiing of Currenct and Foreign Transactions, 31 CFR § 103.122, 131 (2006); ASD, NOTICE TO
MEMBERS 02-21 5-7 (2002); NASD, NOTICE TO MEMBERS 03-34 (2003). Under 31 CFR § 103.137(c),
a life insurer is required to have policies and procedures for obtaining "all relevant customer-related
infonnation necessary for an effective anti-money laundering program."
35. Sorcher, Lost in implementation, supra note 3, at 408-10.
36. fn the course of his assessment work for the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
the author of this Article has reviewed implementing statutory and regulatory language in The British
Virgin fslands, Hong Kong, Niger, the Philippines, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and the United Kingdom and
often found language nearly identical to that used in the Recommendations and Methodology. This may
be due to decisions to enact the two verbatim so as to ensure that legislation complies with the standard.
37.

See infi'a Part J.D.
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persons who own or control the legal person. 38 Reco1m11endation 12
extends these requirements to certain designated non-financial businesses
and persons, which include casinos (which often deal with cash that can be
exchanged for chips and visa versa, providing laundering opportuilities),
real estate agents (in pmi because real estate is often of high value, it is
often used as an investment vehicle by launderers), dealers in precious
metals (included for similar reasons, plus the fact that the ownership of
precious metals can be easily trm1sfeued), lawyers, notaries, and persons
who assist in the setting up of tmsts and companies (these are often
professionals who assist launderers in hiding assets). For simplicity this
Aliicle will refer to those private sector persons subject to preventive
measures requirements as "financial institutions and Designated
NonFinancial Businesses and Professions ("DNFBP")." 39 Although neither
the Recommendation itself nor the Methodology uses the tenn "client
profile," Recmmnendation 5 requires that the financial institution and
DNFBP "detennine the purpose and intended nature of the business
relationship" of a potential (and periodically, of a current) client and a
"knowledge of the customer, their business and risk profile, including,
where necessary, the source offunds." 40
This serves two purposes. If a potential client's identity m1d profile
cannot be established, the financial institution and ce1iain others must
tenninate the business relationship. 41 Second, future transactions of
accepted clients can be measured against this baseline of nonnal or typical
transactions. Specifically, financial institutions and DNFBP must
"understand the purpose, intended relationship, and conduct with the
customer, undergo ongoing customer due diligence in the business
relationship," and must undertake a "scrutiny of transactions through the
course of the relationship to ensure that the transactions being conducted
are consistent with the institution's knowledge of the customer, its business
and risk profile, including, where necessary, the source of funds." 42 In the
event the financial institution and DNFBP cannot comply, the financial
institution should terminate business relations or not lmdertake a

38. FATF 40 Recommendations (2003), supra note 3, at Recommendation 5. The Methodology
allows an exception from this latter requirement in the event the legal person is a public company.
Methodology, supra note 10, at Criterion 5.5.2(b).
39. FATF 40 Recommendations (2003), supra note 3, at Recommendation 12. Recommendation
22 requires that the principles applicable to financial institutions also be applied to branches and
majority owned subsidiaries located abroad. I d. at Reconunendation 22.
40. I d. at Recommendation 5.
41. Recommendation 18 also forbids financial institutions to transact business with shell banks
and "guard against" establishing relations with those that do. Jd. at Recommendation 18.
42. I d. at Recommendation 5.
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transaction. 43 Second, the client profile allows the financial institution and
DNFBP to monitor client transactions to see if they are unusual compared
with the profile.
A key development in the 2003 Recommendations was the adoption
of an optional risk-based approach for ce1iain preventive measures. 44
According to the Financial Action Task Force the adoption of risk
sensitivity "involve[s] identifying and categorizing money laundering risks
and establishing reasonable controls based on risks identified .... "45 This
1isk-based program contrasts with the previous one where each of the
FATF Recommendations was to be implemented objectively regardless of
relative risk levels. 46 FATF Recommendation 5 now allows fmancial
institutions and DNFBP to detennine the extent of such measures on a risksensitive basis, depending on the type of customer, business relationship, or
transaction. 47 Other Recommendations address new teclmologies and
reliance on third parties for due diligence. 48

43. It should also be made mandatory to tile a suspicious transaction report to the Financial
Intelligence Unit, but is not required to do so. !d. at Recommendation 13.
44. This had been highly controversial. During this time the author participated in many of the
FATF working group meetings conceming adoption of such an approach. The 1996 version of the
Recommendations did not include any references to a risk-based approach. The author was present
during many of these discussions.
45. FATF, GUIDANCE ON THE RISK-BASED APPROACH TO COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND
TERRORIST FINANCING: HIGH LEVEL PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES 1-2 (2007), available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/43/46/38960576.pdf (hereinafter FATF, GUIDANCE ON THE RISKBASED APPROACH]. The United States has adopted a risk-based system. FFIEC, Banlc Secrecy Act I
Anti-Money Laundering Examination Manual ll-27, l-l, K-l, M-l, M-2 (2006) [hereinafter FFIEC
MANUAL].
46. FATF 40 Recommendations, supra note 3. According to the FA TF, the new focus on risk
allows financial institution and DNFBP and supervisory authorities to be more efficient and effective in
their use of resources and minimize burdens on customers, although it does not say exactly how.
GUIDANCE ON THE RISK-BASED APPROACH, supra note 45, at 2. During the years when the FATF was
considering the adoption of a risk based-approach disagreement tended to arise at between those FATF
delegates from a law enforcement background and those from a regulatory, particularly bank regulatory
background, with the latter arguing in favor of a risk-based approach. In general, the banlcing regulators
were used to dealing with concepts of risk while law enforcement was not. "Supervisors must be
satisfied that banks and banking groups have in place a comprehensive risk management process
(including Board and senior management oversight) to identify, evaluate, monitor and control or
mitigate all material risks ... " BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANK.ING SUPERVISION, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR
EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION, Principle 7 (2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbsl29.pdf.
47. FATF 40 Reconunendations, supra note 3, at Recommendation 5. The Methodology goes on
to provide certain examples of higher risk categories. Methodology, supra note l 0, at Criteria 5.8 and
5.9. Recommendation 6 singles out a particular category of customers, those individuals who are or
have been entrusted with prominent public functions in a foreign country, as well as family members or
close associates, which are termed "politically-exposed persons." FATF 40 Recommendations, supra
note 3, at Reconunendation 6. It requires financial institutions and DNFBP to have risk management
systems to determine if customers are politically-exposed persons and to take reasonable measures to
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Recommendation 10 reqmres that financial institutions and DNFBP
maintain customer records, including identification records and transaction
records sufficient to pem1it reconstruction of individual transactions
sufficient for evidence in a prosecution, and that these records be
maintained for at least 5 years and be available for inspection by competent
authmities 49 (Special Recommendation VII provides more detail with
respect to wire transfers). 50 This, along with Recommendation 5, allows
investigative and prosecutorial authorities to "follow the money" of
. . 1suspects. 51
cnmma
2. Transaction Monitoring and Suspicious Transaction Reporting
Recommendation 11 requires that financial institutions and DNFBP
pay special attention to "complex, unusual large transactions, and unusual
pattems" of transactions with no "apparent economic or visible lawful
purpose," examine "as far as possible" the background and purpose of such
transactions, and establish the findings in wiiting. 52 This requirement is
separate from Recommendation 5's requirement for ongoing customer due
diligence with respect to "scrutiny of transactions." 53 Recmmnendation 13
requires that a financial institution and DNFBP report promptly to the
govemmental financial intelligence unit if it "suspects" or has "reasonable
grounds" to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a ciiminal activity. The

establish the "source of wealth and source of fimds" and to "conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of
the business relationship." In other words, if a customer is a politically exposed person the financial
institt1tion and certain others must always take measures to establish the source of funds.
Recommendation 6 was added in 2003 to address a perceived public backlash against developed
cmmtry banks that had laundered the proceeds of developed country dictators. I d.
48. Under FA TF Recommendation 8, financial instihitions "should pay special attention to any
·money laundering threats that may arise from new or developing technologies" and must have "policies
and procedures in place" to address any specific risks associated with non-face to face business
relationships or transactions. Jd. at Recommendation 8. FA TF Recommendation 9 pennits financial
institt1tions to rely on third parties to unde1iake some due diligence measures in certain cases. Jd. at
Recommendation 9.
49. FA TF Recommendation 10 requires financial institutions to keep and maintain client account
records, and that they "must be sufficient to permit reconstmction of individual transactions (including
the amounts and types of currency involved if any) so as to provide, if necessary, evidence for
prosecution of criminal activity." !d. at Recommendation 10. 'Competent authorities' refers to all
administrative and law enforcement authorities concerned with combating money laundering and
terrorist financing, including the financial intelligence unit and supervisors. Methodology, supra note
I 0, at page 62.
50. IX Special Recommendations, supra note 3, at Special Recommendation VII.
51. The United States has put in place similar rules. FFIEC MANUAL, supra note 45, at 21, 11822,261-64.
52. FA TF 40 Recommendations, supra note 3, at Recommendation 11.
53. !d. at Recommendation 5.
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Methodology describes this as filing a susp1c10us transaction rep01i. 54
Special Recommendation IV further requires financial institutions and
DNFBP to file reports if they suspect ten-orism financing. 55 It is these
Recommendations, along with Recommendation 5, that create the system
requiring financial institution and DNFBP to monitor customer transactions
based on their profiles and to report to law enforcement those that raise
suspicion that criminal proceeds or ten-orism financing might be involved.
Recommendation 15 requires financial institutions to develop internal
policies, procedures, and controls for anti-money laundering programs,
including compliance management an-angements, internal h·aining, and
audit capacities. 56 Recommendation 16 extends most of these requirements
to the same DNFBP as found in Recommendation 12, although not all. 57
An essential aspect of this pmi of the preventive measures system
should be emphasized. Financial institutions and DNFBP must design and
implement their own systems. 58 While the five-part requirement describes

54. Jd .at Recommendation 13.
55. IX Special Recommendations, supra note 3, at Special Recommendation IV.
Recommendation 21 requires that financial institutions and DNFBP pay "special attention" to business
relationships and transactions with persons from countries that do not or insufficiently apply the FATF
Recommendations (although it does not say how this is to differ from non-special (average?) attention).
FATF 40 Recommendations, supra note 3, at Recommendation 21. This Recommendation raises the
costs of doing business with persons from countries that do not sufficiently apply the Recommendations
as a whole. This creates a financial incentive for countries to implement the Recommendations,
especially as detennined by assessment reports.
56. FATF 40 Recommendations, supra note 3, at Recommendation 15.
57. !d. at Recommendation 16. Recommendation 14 protects financial institution and DNFBP
from any liability for filing suspicious activities reports and prohibits the reporting person from
revealing that such reports are being made (known as the prohibition against tipping off). U.S. mles
comply with these requirements, except that DNFBP include casinos only. 31 CFR § 103.18,19 (2006).
58. See, e.g., FA TF 40 Recommendations, supra note 3, at Recommendation 5 ("Financial
institutions should undertake customer due diligence measures ... but may determine the extent of such
measures on a risk sensitive basis . . . . ") (emphasis added); !d. at Recommendation 6 (Financial
systems should "[hjave appropriate risk management systems") (emphasis added); /d. at
Recommendation 8 ("Financial institutions should have policies and procedures in place to address any
specific risks associated with nonface to face business relationships or transactions.") (emphasis added);
Jd. at Recommendation 9 ("[a] financial institution should satisfy itself that the third party is regulated
and supervised for, and has measures in place to comply with CDD requirements in line with
Recommendations 5 and 10") (emphasis added); !d. at Recommendation 10 ("[R]ecords must be
sufficient to pe1mit reconstruction of individual transactions (including the amounts and types of
currency involved if any) so as to provide, if necessary, evidence for prosecution of criminal activity.")
(emphasis added); Jd. at Recommendation 11 ("Financial institutions should pay special attention to all
complex, unusual large transactions .... The background and purpose of such transactions shoufd. as
far as possible, be examined, the findings established in writing, and be available to help competent
authorities and auditors.") (emphasis added); !d. at Recommendation l3("If a financial institution
suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity, or are
related to te!Torist financing it should be required ... to repmi promptly its suspicions .... ")(emphasis
added); !d. at Recommendation 15 ("Financial institutions should develop program[]s against money
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what these systems are supposed to accomplish, it does not provide any
detail as to how they are supposed to do it. Financial institutions and
DNFBP are not told how to implement those requirements. An exception to
this is Recmmnendation 25, which requires that govemment authorities
establish guidelines and provide feedback to assist financial institutions and
others subject to preventive measures, in pa1iicular "in detecting and
59
reporting suspicious transactions. " Both how govemmental agencies
provide guidelines and feedback, and how the private sector implements its
preventive measure requirements, are discussed below.
C. Public Sector Role
1. Overview
Recommendations 18, 19, and 26 through 32 (and the relevant
materials in the accompanying Methodology for assessment of compliance)
address both the supervisory system to ensure private sector compliance
with its preventive measures requirements and the criminal investigation
and prosecution system for state law enforcement authmities. 60 As shall be
seen, the public sector's role focuses on three basic objectives. The first is
to ensure the private sector's compliance with their preventive measure
responsibilities. 61 Essentially, govemmental authmities must supervise and
regulate financial institutions and DNFBP to ensure compliance. This must
include both guidance and examination functions, including the potential
application of sanctions. The second is to ensure that suspicious transaction
reports lead to the investigation of approp1iate cases of suspected c1ime and
terrorism. 62 Essentially, a financial intelligence unit receives and analyzes
these reports along with other key infonnation. It then decides which
should be ftuiher investigated63 and forwards these to the appropriate
govenm1ent agency (typically the police). They then, sometimes in
consultation with state prosecutors, decide whether and how to go
forward. 64

laundering and terrorist financing ... [including] [t]he development of intemal policies, procedures and
controls, including appropriate compliance management a1Tangements ... .")(emphasis added).
59. I d. at Recommendation 25.
60. Recommendations 18 and 19 are listed under the preventive measures section of the FATF
Recommendations, 26 through 32 are under "C. Institutional and other Measures Necessary in systems
for Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: Competent authorities, their powers and
resources." See FATF 40 Recommendations, supra note 3.
61. See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 214-215 and accompanying text.
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2. Guidelines, Feedback, and Supervision
Recommendation 25 requires that government authorities establish
guidelines and provide feedback to assist financial institutions and DNFBP,
in particular "in detecting and reporting suspicious transactions. "65 The
Methodology goes ftuiher by stating that authorities should provide a
description of money laundering and terrorism financing techniques and
methods and any additional measures to ensure that the systems are
implemented by financial institutions and DNFBP. 66 This includes
infom1ation on current techniques, methods and trends (typologies), 67
examples of actual money laundering cases, and case by case feedback,
including if a suspicious transaction report was found to relate to a
legitimate transaction. 68
In order to ensure compliance with the preventive measures,
Recommendation 23 requires that financial institutions and DNFBP be
subject to adequate regulation and supervision to ensure implementation of
the preventive measures, 69 while Recommendations 29 and 17 require that
supervisors have adequate powers to ensure compliance including the
imposition of sanctions. 70

65. FATF 40 Recommendations, supra note 3 at Reconm1endation 25.
66. Methodology, supra note 10, at criteria 25.1-2.
67. "The methods used for laundering money and the fmancing of terrorism are in constant
evolution. As the international financial sector implements the F ATF standards, criminals must find
alternative channels to launder proceeds of criminal activities and finance illicit activities. The FATF
identifies new threats and researches money laundering and terrorist financing methods. FATF
Typologies reports describe and explain the nature of these methods and threats, thus increasing global
awareness and allowing for earlier detection." FATF, Methods and Trends, available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,3417 ,en_ 322503 79_ 32237202_1_1_1_1_1 ,OO.html.
68. See supra notes 47, 58, and accompanying text.
69. FATF 40 Recommendations, supra note 3, at Recommendation 23. Recommendation 24
extends this requirement to designated non- financial businesses and persons. !d. at Recommendation
24.
70. ld. at Recommendations 29, 17. U.S. laws also comply with these requirements. 31 C.F.R. §
103 (2004), 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a, 1.32-37 ( 1948). The U.S. has levied significant fines, as well as other
supervisory and regulatory orders, against fmancial institutions and casinos. "Since September 11,
FinCEN has imposed a number of fines on banks for failing to meet its reporting requirements.
Moreover, those fines have been extraordinarily large. ABN AMRO, a large European bank, has been
hit with a $30 million fine (and more from state regulators). Western Union has also been hit with a $30
million fine for its record-keeping failures. And, the Department of Justice has brought criminal
prosecutions for anti-money-laundering violations, which resulted in a $50 million civil monetary
penalty against AmSouth and $43 million in combined criminal and civil fines against Riggs Bank,
which put the bank out of business." David Zaring & Elena Baylis, Sending the Bureaucracy to War, 92
IOWA L. REV. 136!, 1414-!5 (2007) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Zaring & Baylis, Bureaucracy to
War].
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The efficacy of these effmis and the resulting techniques that the
p1ivate sector uses to implement preventive measure requirements are
discussed below.
3. Suspicious Transaction Analysis and Refenal for Investigation
Recmmnendation 26 requires that countries establish a financial
intelligence unit 71 that serves as a national center for the receiving,
analysis, and dissemination of suspicious transaction reports and other
information regarding potential money laundering or tenmist financing. It
further states that the financial intelligence unit should have access, directly
or indirectly, on a timely basis to the financial, administrative, and law
enforcement infonnation that it requires to properly undertake its functions,
including the analysis of suspicious transaction reports. 72 Rec01mnendation
10 states that competent authorities (including financial intelligence tmits)
should have access to records kept by financial institutions and DNFBP. 73
Finally, Recmmnendation 40 states that counhies should ensure that their
competent authorities provide the widest possible range of intemational cooperation to their foreign counterparts, including infonnation relating to
money laundering, provided that controls and safeguards are in place to
ensure that information exchanged is used only in a manner consistent with
obligations concerning plivacy and data protection. 74 The Methodology
further states that financial intelligence units should be authorized to allow
foreign intelligence units to search their own databases, including law
enforcement databases, subject to confidentiality safeguards limiting the

71. The line between what some countries fonnally refer to as their financial intelligence unit and
other law enforcement agencies is often blurry. IMF, FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS: AN OVERVIEW
56 (2004), available at http://www.imf.org/extemaVpubs/ftlfiulfiu.pdf [hereinafter IMF, FINANCIAL
INTELLIGENCE UNITS]. This Article refers to the financial intelligence unit using a f1.mctional definition.
72. FATF 40 Recommendations, supra note 3, at Recommendation 26. For example, FinCEN has
access to numerous databases. These include several databases of criminal reports sourced from the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement's TECS II system, the FBI's National Criminal Information
Center, the Drug Enforcement Administration's Narcotics and Dangerous Dmgs Information and NDIC
Systems, the United States Secret Service database, and tbe United States Postal Inspection Service. It
also has access to the Office of Foreign Assets Control's list of Specially Designated Nationals, the
Social Security Administration's Death Master File, and the State Department's list of Designated
Foreign Terrorist Organizations. It also has access to commercial database services from organizations
such as Dun & Bradstreet, LEXIS/NEXIS, and credit bureaus as well as commercially available lists of
"Politically Exposed Persons." FinCEN also maintains its own database of investigations and queries
conducted through FinCEN's systems. FINCEN, FEASIBILITY OF A CROSS-BORDER ELECTRONIC FUNDS
TRANSFER REPORTING SYSTEM UNDER THE BANI( SECRECY ACT 9 (October 2006), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/CBFTFS_ Complete.pdf [hereinafter FINCEN, CROSSBORDER ELECTRONIC FUNDS).
73. FATF 40 Recommendations, supra note 3, at Recommendation 10.
74. Id. at Recommendation 40.
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use of the data. 75 This is the only substantive Recommendation relating to
fmancial intelligence units (the Methodology adds little). 76
A few other key recommendations relate to the implementation of
preventive measures. Potentially the most important are 33 and 34.
Recommendation 33 requires that countries ensure that timely information
on the beneficial ownership and control of legal persons is available and 34
extends this requirement to "express tmsts" and other tmst-like legal
relationships. 77 These Recmmnendations relate to the customer
of Recommendation
5. However,
identification
requirements
Recommendations 33 and 34 are highly problematic in cormnon law
countries where information on beneficial ownership or trust relations is
not kept by government agencies. 78 Another potentially key
recommendation is Special Recommendation VIII, which states that
countries "should review the adequacy of laws and regulations that relate to
entities that can be abused for the fmancing of terrmism." The
Recommendation goes on to state that "non-profit organisations are
particularly vulnerable, and countries should ensure that they cannot be
misused ... by ten·orist organisations posing as legitimate entities. "79
D. Private Sector Successes and Failures

1. Overview
There are a number of public policy considerations relating to the
privatization of preventive measures. The most important is the
effectiveness of implementation, followed by cost and certain data access

75. Methodology, supra note 10, at Criterion 40.4.1.
76. Following the terrorist attacks of September, 2001, staff at the IMF produced the first draft of
a methodology for assessment of the 40 Recommendations and (then) vm Special Recommendations.
The draft methodology included a significant number of criteria spelling out in detail the duties of
financial intelligence units, including most of those described in in/i-a note 153 and accompanying text.
However, during a meeting in Basel in February, 2002 representatives of the Egmont Group, an
informal association of financial intelligence units, see http://www.egmontgroup.org/, objected to the
spelling out in such detail of the purposes and activities of FrUs because of the difficulty of finding
consensus on such a large amount of detail from such a large group. Nevetiheless, the representatives
largely concun·ed that the criteria in the methodology described "an effective" financial intelligence
unit. The author of this Article was the principal author of those criteria and was present dming that
meeting. The U.S. largely complies with these requirements. U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT,
supra note 34, at 226-40.
77. FATF 40 Recommendations, supra note 3, at Recommendations 33 and 34.
78. U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 34, at 226-40.
79. IX Special Recommendations, supra note 3, at Recommendation VIII. Recorrunendation 18
forbids the licensing of shell banks, or banks that have no physical presence and that are therefore easy
to set up and difficult to regulate. FATF 40 Special Recommendations (2003 ), supra note 3 at
Recommendation 18.
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issues. Compliance assessments have generally fom1d that record-keeping
requirements have been effectively implemented. 80 This is less hue of the
customer identification81 and profiling requirements, where implementing
mles have sometimes been found to be inadequate or where effectiveness
bas been difficult to detennine, especially with respect to beneficial
ownership. 82 Concerns as to the workability of these requirements can be

80. Verhelst e-mail, supra note 20. This is demonstrated by the fact that no FATF papers have
been commissioned or written concerning failures in the record-keeping requirements. Also, a review of
several recent assessment reports indicates no problems with recordkeeping. See, e.g., U.S. MUTUAL
EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 34, at 126-36; FATF, MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT: ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AUSTRIA 127-30 (2009), m'ai/ab/e a/
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/22/50/44146250.pdf [hereinafter AUSTRIA MUTUAL EVALUATION
REPORT]; FATF, THIRD MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT: ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING
THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM, AUSTRALIA 80-84 (2005), available a/ http://www.fatfgafi.org/dataoecd/60/33/35528955.pdf [hereinafter AUSTRALIA MUTUAL EV ALUAT!ON REPORT]; FATF,
THIRD MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT: ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING
OF TERRORISM, CANADA 149-154 (2008), available a/ http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/
5/3/40323928.pdf [hereinafter CANADA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT]; FATF, THIRD MUTUAL
EVALUATION REPORT: ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM,
UNITED KINGDOM 132-39 (2007), available a/ http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/55/29/39064399.pdf
[hereinafter U.K. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT]; FATF, THIRD MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT:
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM, HONG KONG, CHINA
104-11 (2008), available a/ http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/19/38/41032809.pdf [hereinafter HONG
KONG CHINA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT].
81. Verhelst e-mail, supra note 20. The overall effectiveness of client identification tends not to be
addressed in FATF compliance reports (or only briefly with little information), often because the rules
implementing the FATF Recommendations are themselves inadequate. See, e.g., U.S. MUTUAL
EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 34 (not discussed at all); AUSTRIA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT,
supra note 80, at 102-103, 105 {not discussed in detail); AUSTRALIA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT,
supra note 80, at 70 (inadequate rules obviate discussion of their effectiveness); CANADA MUTUAL
EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at 129 (inadequate rules obviate discussion of their effectiveness);
U.K. MUTUAL EvALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at 115 (inadequate rules obviate discussion of their
effectiveness); HONG KONG CHINA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note at 96-97 {not discussed
in detail); see also discussion supra note 80 and accompanying text. Based on the author of this
Article's considerable personal experience, when rules are adequate reports may fail to address the issue
because oftbe difficulty in determining effectiveness.
82. Verhelst e-mail, supra note 20. The overall effectiveness of client profiling tends not to be
addressed in FATF compliance reports (or only briefly with little information), often because the rules
implementing the FATF Recommendations are inadequate. See, e.g., U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION
REPORT, supra note 34 (not discussed at all); AUSTRIA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80,
at 106 (not discussed); AUSTRALIA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at 71 (inadequate
rules obviate discussion of their effectiveness); CANADA MUTUAL Ev ALUATJON REPORT, supra note 80,
at 130 (inadequate mles obviate discussion oftbeir effectiveness); U.K. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT,
supra note 80, at 116 (inadequate rules obviate discussion of their effectiveness); HONG KONG CHINA
MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at 96-97 (not discussed in detail). Based on the author
of this article's considerable personal experience, when rules are adequate reports may fail to address
the issue because of the difficulty in determining effectiveness.
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based both on the effectiveness of the system as designed by the FATF
Recommendations 83 and on how that system is implemented.
According to some scholars there is little evidence that preventive
measures have reduced money laundering. 84 This is particularly tme with
respect to transaction monitoring and suspicious transaction reporting
requirements, where both scholars and practitioners have raised serious
doubts as to whether they actually work to help catch money launderers
and teiTorist financers. 85 For example, in the U.S., suspicious transaction
repmis have apparently led to very few investigations; in fact, FinCEN, the
U.S. financial intelligence tmit, does not even repo1i how many are
reviewed by government authorities. 86 Statistics collected in the course of
Financial Action Task Force mutual evaluations of other countries also
suggest that few successful investigations are developed from suspicious
transaction reports. 87 If reporting helps it may only be at the ex post stage,
when the authorities can use records to follow the money, not at the
detection or "preventive" stage. There is also a strong indication that many
financial institutions do not believe that financial intelligence units or other
governmental authmities make much use of suspicious activity reports, in
part because the reports are too numerous to be helpful. 88 Perhaps most
significantly, a common, if more private, refrain by financial intelligence
unit and financial investigator expe1is at F ATF is that the system of client
profiling and monitoring of transactions simply does not work to provide a
83. With respect to client identification and profiling, FATF mutual evaluation reports tend to
consider both the efficiency of the system as required and overall effectiveness. With respect to
technical issues in implementation see inji·a note 85 and accompanying text.
84. Investigations have a failure rate of99.9%. Zaring & Baylis, Bureaucracy to War, supra note
70, at 1413.
85. FATF mutual evaluation reports usually consider only the efficiency of the system as required
under the Recommendations and not overall effectiveness at actually preventing money laundering or
terrorism financing. Rules implementing the FATF Recommendations are themselves often found to be
inadequate. See, e.g., U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 34, at 160; AUSTRIA MUTUAL
EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at 106; AUSTRALIA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note
80, at 71; CANADA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note80, at 130; U.K. MUTUAL EVALUATION
REPORT, supra note 80, at I 16; HONG KONG CHINA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at
97. With respect to technical issues in implementation see infi·a notes 239-241 and accompanying text.
86. Cuellar, Criminal Law, supra note 3 at 323,378.
87. See, e.g., AUSTRIA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at 132; AUSTRALIA
MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at I 12-14; CANADA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT,
supra note 80, at 213-14; U.K. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at 178; HONG KONG
CHINA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at 96-98.
88. "Fmstration mounts that ... [the suspicious transaction reports] filed were of no use to
apathetic or overwhelmed govemment authorities." John Adams, Anti-Money Laundering: Diligence is
Getting Pretty Pricey, Bank Technology News (August 2007), available at http://www.dominionad visors. com/press/ in- the-news/2 00 7/anti -money-laundering-diligence-getting-pretty-pricey
[hereinafter Adams, Diligence is Getting Pretty Pricey].
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significant number of effective leads in proceeds of crime or terrorism
financing investigations.
In 2001 Professors Ann Seidman, Robert B. Seidman, and Nalin
Abeysekere outlined a theory of legislative drafting that discussed how
policy is effectively implemented though a particular law or rule. 89 They
identify three broad categories that detennine whether a person (actor)
subject to a legislative mandate will effectively implement that mandate:
the actor's understanding of the relevant rule (objective knowledge); the
actor's antiCipation of the implementing agency's behavior (the
govemment's incentive or disincentive effects as applied to the actor); and
the non-legal constraints and resources of the actor's own environment. 90
They fmiher divide these three broad categories into seven sub-categories:
(1) the precise wording of the rule; (2) the actor's opportunity to obey the
rule (3) the actor's capacity to obey the rule, (4) the c01mnunication of the
rule to the actor, (5) the actor's incentive to obey or disobey the rule, (6) the
process by which the actor decides whether and how to obey the rule,
including input, feedback, and decision-making systems by which the actor
chooses how to behave in the face of the rule; and finally (7) the actor's
ideology. 9 I
One can further consolidate and elucidate these categories so that they
are clear and easy to apply in the case of preventive measures. First, the
more clearly stated 92 and objective 93 a rule is, the easier it is for both the

89. See generally ANN SEIDMAN, ROBERT B. SEIDMAN & NALIN ABEYSEKERE, LEGISLATIVE
DRAFTING FOR DEMOCRATIC SOCIAL CHANGE (2001) [hereinafter SEIDMAN ET AL. LEGISLATIVE
DRAFTING].
90. !d. at 94.
91. Jd. at 95-6. See also Ann Seidman and Robert B. Seidman, Is Legislation an Unprincipled
Mess? JTLAM: Drafting Evidence-Based Legislation for Democratic Social Change, 89 B.U.L. REv.
435,454 (2009) [hereinafter Seidman eta/., Is Legislation an Unprincipled Mess?].
92. See REED DICKERSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING 1-7 (1954) (introducing
legal drafting and specifically focusing on wording and achieving substantive clarity as means to
improving legal instruments, including legislation and constitutions); TOBIAS A. DORSEY, LEGISLATIVE
DRAFTER'S DESK BOOK 169-240 (2006) (describing the importance of writing effectively in legislative
drafting and emphasizing that "the essence of effective drafting is clear writing"), citied in Seidman et
al., Is Legislation an Unprinciples Mess?, supra note 91, at n.35. Of course, there are many scholars
who question whether language can ever be clear. See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing
Structure of Legitimacy in StatutOIJI Interpretation, 108 HA.Rv. L. REv. 593, 602-03 (1995) (discussing
the postmodem view that there may never be clarity in statutory language). The point I make here is
that one can be relatively more or less clear, if never absolutely clear.
93. Meaning a standard relatively less subject to interpretation (as in "clear and objective
standards" that provide "specific and detailed guidance"), Godji-ey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428
(1980), quoted in CarolS. Steiker and Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355,379-80 (1995), is
not objective as in revealing a particular truth. See Edward L. Rubin, Social Movements and La11'
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actor and the enforcing authority to implement. Effective input and
feedback by the implementing authmity is a pmi of this communication, in
that it helps the actor to conect her or his understanding of the mle.
Second, the process by which the actor decides whether and how to obey
the mle is affected by incentives, including economic or other incentives
and any sanctions (or benefits) applied by the implementing authority.
Third, the actor's capacity to obey the mle may be limited, meaning she or
he may simply not have the means to do so. Finally, the actor may have an
ideological reason favoring or disfavoring implementation, which would
affect her or his motivation.
With respect to the effectiveness of implementation by financial
institutions and DNFBP of the Financial Action Task Force's preventive
measures, three effects appear to dominate: (1) the clmity and objectivity of
the standard as supplemented by feedback from implementing agencies, (2)
economic incentives plus the effect of sanctions for non-compliance, and
(3) objective capacity. This Article will now address these three basic
effects.
2. Clmity and Objectivity of the Rule
As noted earlier, compliance assessments have generally found that
record-keeping requirements have been effectively implemented. 94 This
should not be too surprising in that the mles as w1itten are relatively clear
and unambiguous. This is far less tme of the customer identification and
profiling requirements and the monitoring and repmiing requirements.
While the Recommendations describe in some detail the five required
components (establish customer identity, create customer profile, compare
transactions with customer profile, examine those that do not fit, report
those that are suspicious), neither they nor the Methodology give much
guidance as to exactly how far, and using what crite1ia, financial
institutions and others certain should go in doing so. 95 In other words, they
are highly subjective. The Recommendations state that financial institutions
and DNFBP must take "reasonable measures" to vetify the identity of the
beneficial owner of an account such that the financial institution or DNFBP
"is satisfied" that it knows who the beneficial owner is. 96 This includes
taking "reasonable measures" to understand the ownership and control

Reform: Passing Through the Door: Socia!JV!ol'ement Literature and Legal Scholarship, !50 U. PA. L.
REV. I, 34-46 (2001) (discussing critical theory and objectivity).
94. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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structure of the customer. 97 "Information" on the purpose and nature of the
business relationship should be obtained to ensure adequate profiling, as
well as "where necessary" the source of funds. 98 Recommendation 6
requires "appropriate" risk management systems to determine whether the
customer is a politically exposed person and that "reasonable measures" be
taken to establish the source of wealth and funds. 99 Recommendation 11
requires that "special attention" be paid to transactions that have no
"apparent" economic or visible lawful purpose, and that their background
and purpose be examined "as far as possible." 100 Recommendation 13
requires the repmiing of transactions that a financial institution or DNFBP
"suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect" are the proceeds of a
c1iminal activity or are related to tenorist financing. 101 Finally,
Recommendation 15 requires "appropriate" compliance management
anangements. 102
The phrases in quotes, including "reasonable measures," "is satisfied"
"where necessary," "appropriate," "special attention," "apparent," "as far as
possible," "suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect," are not defined
in the Recommendations nor the Methodology. They are anything but clear
and objective, unavoidably giving rise to subjective implementation. 103 For
example, would a "reasonable measure" to vetifY the identity of the
beneficial owner be simply asking the client if there was a beneficial owner
other than the person opening the account, or should a bank hire a private
investigator? What constitutes "special attention" to transactions which
have no "apparent" economic or visible lawful purpose? Should a bank
simply give a once-over review based on the examiner's past experience or
should it investigate each of the client's activities in detail?
The use of such highly subjective terms does, however, make clear
that financial institutions and DNFBP must design as well as implement
their own systems based on considerable subjective judgment. An
impmiant aspect of this "design and implement" requirement is the new
1isk-based option. Because client identification and profiling measmes

97. !d.
98. FATF 40 Recommendations, supra note 3, at Recommendation 5.
99. !d. at Recommendation 6.
I 00. !d. at Recommendation II.
101. !d. at Recommendation 13.
I 02. !d. at Recmmnendation 15.
I 03. Not surprisingly the lack of clarity in the rules as transferred to legislation is a major
complaint of the private sector. KPMG INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING SURVEY
2007: HOW BANKS ARE FACING UP TO THE CHALLENGE 7-8 (2007), available at http://
us.kpmg.com/microsite/FSLibraryDotCom/docs/AML2007FULL.pdf [hereinafter KPMG, ANTIMONEY LAUNDERING SURVEY).
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may be applied on a risk sensitive basis as is "detennine[d]" by the
financial institution or DNFBP/ 04 such persons have even greater
subjective discretion in designing their systems. According to the FATF,
such an approach "requires resources and expertise to gather and interpret
information on risks, both at the country and institutional levels, to develop
procedures and systems and to train personnel. It further requires that
sound and -vvell-trainedjudgment be exercised in the implementation .... It
will certainly lead to a greater diversity in practice which should lead to
innovations and improved compliance. However, it may also cause
uncertainty regarding expectations, difficulty in applying uniform
regulatOJy treatment, and lack of understanding by customers ... " 105 On
their face these mles add even more subjectivity and discretion.
There is another problem that is not directly related to the lack of
clarity and subjective nature of the Recommendations. While the client
identification and profiling requirements include a risk component, 106 the
monitming and reporting requirements do not.
Suspicious transactions will have different degrees of likelihood that
c1iminal proceeds or tenolism financing are involved. In theory, a
transaction could be ranked from a near zero risk that it includes crime
proceeds or finances tenorism, up to a near ce1iainty that it does. However,
the Recommendations do not state at which point a financial institution or
DNFBP should report, or if it should even make a notation of estimated
risk on the suspicious h·ansaction report. This makes a real "risk sensitive"
system difficult if not impossible to apply.
Next, suspicious h·ansactions will vary as to the size or amount of
criminal proceeds or teiTorism financing, from a single pe1my to billions.
However, the preventive measures standards do not provide guidance as to
whether financial institutions and DNFBP should consider all transactions
equally, regardless of the size of the suspected criminal proceeds, or
whether they should focus on transactions with relatively large amounts of
suspected criminal proceeds. While it might appear logical for financial
institutions to apply greater effo1is to detennine the probity of relatively
larger transactions, there is no guidance to this effect.
One restriction on the discretion afforded by the Recommendations
and Methodology could come from the methods, trends, typologies, and
feedback that govemment authorities are required to provide financial
institutions and DNFBP. 107 Methods, trends, and typologies are produced
104.
105.
106.
107.

See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
FATF, GUIDANCE ON Ti-lE RISK-BASED APPROACH, supra note 45, at 2 (emphasis added).
See supra notes 44-4 7 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
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and published by the Financial Action Task Force, FATF associate
members, FATF-style regional bodies, 108 and national authorities,
especially financial intelligence units. However, such guidance and
feedback rarely include assistance in interpreting terms or designing
systems for profiling, monitoring, and reporting. Rather, they nonnally
only provide examples of activities that heighten the risk that a particular
client or transaction represents the proceeds of crime or tenorism
financing. These tend to be limited to basic examples, such as which
geogTaphical areas include a higher incidence of tenorism (e.g. Pakistan) or
typical tactics used by launderers (e.g. transfers among different shell
companies). 109 They do not include examples of effective systems to detect
them.
For example, FinCEN, the U.S. financial intelligence unit, provides
many sanitized examples (meaning that identifying infonnation like actual
names and dates are deleted) of past cases of laundering and tenorism. 110 It
also provides what it refers to as "red flags" that indicate a higher risk of
laundering and tenorism finance, which are also based on prior cases. 111
Such "red flags" include, for example, "[a] customer uses unusual or
suspicious identification documents that cannot be readily verified" or
"[t]he customer's background differs from that which would be expected on
the basis of his or her business activities. "112 Besides being rather obvious,
these "red flags" do not tell the financial institution or DNFBP what kind of
diligence to apply to these transactions or at what point they should report
them. Oddly, FinCEN does not even make objective infonnation readily

108. See supra note 67.
109. See, e.g., FATF-GAFJ, MONEY LAUNDERING METHODS & TRENDS, available at
http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_32250379 _32237277 _l_l_l
_l_l,OO.html; FATF-GAFI, FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, REPORT ON
MONEY LAUNDERING TYPOLOGIES 2003-2004, 19-23, available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org
/dataoecd/191ll/33624379.pdf (discussing Politically Exposes Persons ("PEPs")); FATF-GAFl,
FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, REPORT ON MONEY LAUNDERING TECHNOLOGIES 2001-2002, 12-14,
available at http://www.fatf-gafi .org/dataoecd/29/35/3403 8006.pdf (discussing corruption and private
banking).
II 0. These examples include summaries of Jaw enforcement cases, tips on the preparation and
filing of suspicious activity reports, issues and guidance for financial institutions on procedural matters,
topics warranting attention and recent court decisions, an industry forum open to financial institutions to
outline issues of concern to their community, and a mailbag and feedback section which addresses
issues raised by the financial institution industry, such as filing of suspicious activity reports and
identification of suspicious activity categories. See generally U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT,
supra note 34.
Ill. FFIEC MANUAL, supra note 45, at Appendix F. While this section is explicitly entitled
"Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 'Red Flags,"' other sections of the Manual include various
examples of money laundering and terrorism financing techniques. See, e.g., id. at Appendix G.
ll2. Jd. at F-l.
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available, such as !mown havens for money laundering or the names of
senior foreign political figures subject to the heightened due diligence
mles. 113
Another serious problem is a lack of feedback on suspicious
transaction reports actually filed by financial institutions and casinos to
FinCEN. 114 According to a series of coinfidential interviews the author
conducted with compliance officers at three U.S. banks, each believed it
would be vety helpful indeed to !mow if and why particular suspicious
transaction repmis resulted in a successful investigation. This would pennit
the bank to improve their monitoring and repmiing systems by allowing
them to review their systems based on actual successes and failures.
However, FinCEN does not provide such feedback at all. 115
FinCEN's methods are by no means unusual. A recent survey of
Australia, the U.S., the United Kingdom, France, and certain other
O.E.C.D. countries suggests that there is little useful infonnation provided
by domestic financial intelligence units to financial institutions and
DNFBP, especially with respect to new money laundering techniques and
trends within existing techniques. 116
Without clear instmctions in the Recommendations or Methodology
on how to design and implement a preventive measures system, and
without adequate guidance and feedback to supplement those standards,
financial institutions and DNFBP still face a compliance supervismy
process along with the threat of sanctions for non-compliance. Because the
details of individual examinations are confidential, it is difficult to ascertain
with any certainty how the supervismy process detem1ines compliance. For
example, FinCEN's published compliance actions 117 reveal very little detail
as to nahtre of the preventive measures systems reviewed. 118 Nevertheless,

113. Sorcher, Lost in Implementation, supra note 3, at 415.
114. U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 34, at 65-68. Reporting institutions often do
not know how information reported to FinCEN is used, if at all. Nicole !VI. Healy, Edward J. Krauland,
Kevin L. Shepherd, Cari Stinebower, Richard L. Fmehauf, William P. Barry, Abraham Wise, Scott
Nance, & Tessa Capeloto, US. a11d I11ternational Anti-Jv!oney Laundering Developments, 43 lNT'L LAW.
795, 802 (2009) [hereinafter Healy, U.S. and International Anti-Money Laundering Developments].
115. U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 34, at 65-68.
116. See Matthew H. Fleming, UK Lm11 Enforcement Agency Use and Ma11agement of SARs:
Toward Determining the Value of the Regime, 59 (2005), available at http://www.jdi.ucl.ac.uk/
downloads/pub! ications/research_reports/Fleming_LEA_Use_and_Mgmt_of_SARs _J une2005 .pdf
[hereinafter Fleming, UK Law Enforcement].
117. FinCEN, Compliance Actions, http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/ea/ (last visited Apr. 6,
2011 ).
118. "[The regulated industry] has accused FinCEN of assessing the t!nes randomly and
unpredictably and has sought more guidance from the agency on how it decides to assess fines and why
it makes them so large." Zaring & Baylis, Bureaucracy to War, supra note 70, at 1415.
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a review of these actions clearly shows that breaches identified constitute
clear failmes in implementing the most basic of system requirements. 119
Also, in the course of conducting assessments of compliance with the
FATF Recommendations, this author has reviewed hundreds of
examination reports of financial institutions by supervisory authorities in
six different countries, both developed and developing. As with the
published FinCEN compliance actions, with no exception, the reports
reveal an attention only to fundamental system requirements. In no
instances had the supervisor provided any assistance in designing or
redesigning preventive measures systems beyond reco1m11ending basic
requirements, or given any attention to the likely overall effectiveness of
the systems in place.
With respect to clarity and objectivity of the rule, one would expect
financial institutions and DNFBP to perfom1 relatively well with respect to
recordkeeping and less well with respect to client identification, profiling,
transaction monitoring, and suspicious transaction repmiing. As will be
demonstrated in Part II, this stands in sharp contrast to the duties of the
private sector in enforcing the income tax laws. There, the rules are very
clear, highly objective, and, not surprisingly, implemented far more
effectively.
3. Economic and Regulatory Incentive Effects
There are a number of incentive effects that might militate both in
favor of and against financial institutions and DNFBP seeking to
implement an effective identification system. This section will begin by
reviewing the conflicting incentives that arise when a policing function is
ptivatized as an unfunded mandate.
P1ivate sector persons may voluntarily assume policing
responsibilities 120 when crimes directly affecting them are not being
119. See, e.g., Doha Banlc, New York Branch, Case Number 2009-1 (Dep't of Treasury April 20,
2009), available at http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/eaffiles/Doha.pdf (wire transfer monitoring did
not extend to multiple transfers, late filing of suspicious activity reports); NY Branch United Bank for
Africa, Case Number 2008-3 (Dep't of Treasury April 28, 2008), available at http://www.fincen.gov/
news_room/eaffiles/UBAAssessment.pdf (no internal controls); El Noa Noa Corporation, Case Number
2008-2 (Dep't of Treasury April 14, 2008), available at http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/ea/files/
E1NoaNoa.pdf (no implementation of written antimony laundering control program).
120. In the Anglo-Saxon world enforcement of the criminal law was almost entirely private up until
the first half of the nineteenth century, when the state began to take a dominant role in policing,
investigating, and prosecuting breaches of the criminal law. Ric Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, 42
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911, 921-24 (2007) [hereinafter Simmons, Private Criminal Justice]. Since the
American Civil War, however, the reverse, or the privatizing of law enforcement, has proliferated.
BRUCE L. BENSON, To SERVE AND PROTECT 5-7 (1998) [hereinafter BENSON, TO SERVE AND
PROTECT). "Privatizing" a public service can mean both the decision to provide a service and the
administrative action to produce the service. James F. Gilsinan, James Millar, Neil Seitz, James Fisher,
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adequately addressed by the public sector. This is sometimes referred to as
"self help."l21 As a general rule, the private, for-profit sector seeks to
minimize costs as a way of maximizing profits. For this reason, one would
expect that when a private sector actor chooses to assume the costs of law
enforcement it would do so only when the benefits to the actor exceed the
costs. 122 This calculus can be altered if the costs of such patiicipation are
paid wholly or in part by the public sector. l13 This can be accomplished
through a general subsidy for carrying out a patiicular police function or
though a system of bounty-hunting or reward for successfully assisting in
the investigation or prosecution of a wrongdoer. 124 However, in both cases
the calculus would be the same. The private sector person will carry out
such a police function to the extent that total benefits from reducing the
adverse effects of crime on the ptivate sector person plus any subsidy or
bounty exceed total costs involved.
The private sector can also be forced by law to take on the costs of
private law enforcement with no compensation for doing so. 125 In most
such cases, such unfunded mandates on the private sector are incentivized
by applying penalties for failure to discharge adequately the required
duties. 126 At least at first look, this appears to be the case with all of the
preventive measures applicable to financial institutions and DNFBP.
Ellen Harshman, Muhammad Islam & Fred Yeager, The Role of Private Sector Organizations in the
Control and Policing of Serious Financial Crime and Abuse, 15 J. OF FIN. CRIME Ill, 112 (2008)
[hereinafter Gilsinan, The Role of Private Sector Organizations]. In this Ariicle "privatized" law
enforcement services refers to the second meaning only.
121. One of the most obvious historical examples is the private Pinkerton police force. Elizabeth E.
Joh, The Forgotten Threat: Private Policing and the State, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 357, 364-66
(2006) [hereinafter Joh, The Forgotte11 Threat]. Even such private policing can bring a public benefit.
Clifford D. Shearing, The Relation BeilFee/1 Public and Private Policing, in MODERN POLICING, 339,
404 (Michael Tonry & Norval MmTis eds., 1992), cited in Debra Livingston, Police Discretion cmd the
Quality af Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the Nell' Polici11g, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551,
n.387 (1997).
122. This presumably would include costs of lobbying, bribing, etc. the public to protect tlie
interests of the private actors.
123. Gilsinan eta!. have referred to this as "the enthusiastic intelligence operative." Gilsinan, The
Role of Private Sector Organizations, supra note 120, at !14-15.
124. James Fisher, Ellen Harshman, William Gillespie, Henry Ordower, Leland Ware, & Frederick
Yeager, Privatizing Regulation: Whistle-blowing and Bounzv-Hunting i11 the Financial Services
Industries, 19 DICK. J. INT'L L. 117, 142-43 (2000) [hereinafter Fisher, Privatizing Regulation].
!25. There is no genera! legal requirement that private actors enforce the laws beyond the crime of
misprision of a felony, which requires both active concealment and a failure to disclose a crime.
Christopher Mark Curenton, The Past, Present, and Future of 18 US. C. § 4: A11 Exploration of the
Federal Misprision ofFelony Statute, 55 ALA. L. REv. 183, 185 (2003 ).
!26. These are also known as "unfunded private mandates" as opposed to ·'intergovernmental"
mandates, where a superior level of government requires an inferior level to do something for free.
Gregory G. Rapawy, Recent Legislation: Federallvfandate Procedures, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 571,572
( 1999). Unfunded mandates are also known as "regulatory expenditures," in that the regulation creates
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If the private sector party were to see no direct benefit for its
contribution to effective law enforcement, other than avoiding penalties for
non-compliance, the inherent incentive structure in such an anangement
suggests that the private actor would seek to minimize costs as much as
possible. 127 Those costs would include those involved in implementing the
unfunded duties plus any sanctions for non-perfonnance. 128
To achieve the goal of spending as little as possible on required duties,
the private party could seek to interpret those duties as nanowly as
possible, meaning as nanowly as can be gotten away with before the cost
of sanctions for non-compliance exceeded the savings from not acting.
Certainly the more clear and objective the p1ivatized enforcement
requirement, the harder it would be for the private party to interpret "down"
its duties. 129 However, any ambiguity would suggest that at least some of
the interaction between private and public sectors involves the fonner
attempting to restrict duties and the latter seeking to expand them. This
general incentive stmcture suggests that financial institution and DNFBP
would tend to minimize effmis to create effective systems.
There may be incentives working in the opposite direction, however.
It may be that although they are required to implement preventive systems
as an unfunded mandate, financial" institutions and DNFBP may have some
self-interest in implementing those mandates.
As a general matter, criminal law enforcement involves at least some
degree of public goods. 130 The benefits accme not only to one or more
costs on the party mandate to enforce them even if no money is appropriated to pay for those costs.
Jolm D. Graham, Paul R. Noe & Elizabeth L. Branch, Managing the RegulatOIJ' State, 33 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 953,985 (2006). In the United States, The Unfunded Mandates Refonn Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C.
1532 (Supp. 1995) requires both a qualitative and quantitative assessment of the anticipated costs and
benefits of unfunded federal government mandates on state and local governments and on the private
sector. Enacting unfunded mandates is also known as "cost-shifting." Thomas F. Burke, The Rights
Revolution Continues: Why Nell' Rights are Born (and Old Rights Rare~v Die), 33 CONN. L. REV. 1259,
1264 (2001).
127. With respect to the mandated privatization of financial regulation, Gilsinan et al. have referred
to the private purveyors of police services as "the gmdging informant." Gilsinan, The Role of Private
Sectar Organizations, supra note 120, at I 13-14.
128. There may be some analogous incentive problems in the public sector, in that government
agencies may tend not to focus their attention on issues or tasks that they believe are not central to their
main mjssion. See generally lAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO
AND WHY THEY DO IT (I 989).
I 29. At the least the public sector would be expected to provide the private actor with "more
precise parameters" with respect to the requirement. Gilsinan, The Role of Private Sector
Organizations, supra note 120, at I 14.
130. The economist Paul Samuelson originally defined a "public good" (or a collective
consumption good) as something "which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual's
consumption of such a good leads to no subtractions from any other individual's consumption of that
good ... "Paul Samuelson, The Pure The01y of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. OF ECON. & STATISTICS
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persons who might suffer from any specific criminal act but to all persons,
primarily through deterrence. For this reason, the benefits of self-help are
shared by :fi·ee riders, once again militating against the private sector
spending any money on a mandate beyond the minimum to avoid
sanctions. 131 However, in many instances there may be an overlap between
public and p1ivate benefits. 132 While one would expect the private sector to
try and control free-riders by focusing benefits on themselves, to the extent
that such self-help did spill over to those not paying for the service, such
private law enforcement would still qualify as a public good. In such cases,
however, an obvious detriment would be that the private law enforcement
would be directed as much as possible towards private rather than public
benefits, and would presumably be limited by such motivation. 133
Financial institutions and DNFBP may voluntarily incur the costs of
preventive measures for four basic reasons: to avoid concentration risk,
reputational risk, operational risk, and legal or regulatory risk. In banking,
concentration risk is defined as excessive exposure to single borrowers or
dependence on single depositors. 134 It is better to spread the risk of default
among a group of unconnected borrowers than to concentrate the risk in
one; it is better to spread the risk of withdrawal of debt capital among a
group of depositors than to concentrate it in one. Concentration risk also
exists in both insurance and secmities sectors for analogous reasons. 135 A
key benefit of the client identification requirement could be to help
financial institutions and DNFBP reduce this risk. The extent to which a
387, 387 (1954). "Which all enjoy in common" means that no one can (effectively) be excluded from
the benefit. Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice and the Economic Analysis of Law, 19 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 487, 492-93 (1994). The economist Dennis Mueller describes law enforcement as a "pure"
public good. DENNIS MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III, 10-1 I (2003). However, some commentators have
noted that selective enforcement, notably when racially based, is not a public good with respect to those
who are victims of that enforcement. Paul Butler, Stan· Is to Clinton As Regular Prosecutors Are to
Blacks, 40 B.C. L. REv 705, 711 (1999).
131. In a group that provides itself with a public good, a "free rider" is one who contributes little or
nothinng to the cost of the good while enjoying its benefits as fully as any other member of the group.
The free rider problem acts as a disincentive for groups voluntarily to provide public goods unless there
is some way to punish or otherwise control free-ridership. Oliver Kim & Mark Walker, The Free Rider
Problem: Experimental Evidence, 43 PUBLIC CHOICE 3, 3 (1984).
132. Joh, The Forgotten Threat, supra note 121, at 375-83.
!33. Ric Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, supra note 120, at 925.
!34. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CUSTOMER DUE DILIGENCE FOR BAl'H(S
(:2001), at paragraphs 14-15, available at http://www.bis.org/publfbcbs85.pdf [hereinafter BASEL
COMI'vl., CUSTOMER DUE DILIGENCE].
135. International Association of Insurance Supervisors, Glossary, http://www.iaisweb.org/
index.cfm?pageiD=47&vSearchLetter=c## (defining "concentration risk"). It is far riskier ro have a
single insured than to spread the risk among many insured. FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMISSION,
GUIDANCE NOTES CONCENTRATION RISK 13 (2008), available at http://www.fsc.gi/download
/adobelbanlcing/noteconcrislc.pdf.
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party would spend money to identifY clients, including beneficial owners
and controllers of those clients, would be based on a balance of costs to
benefits of avoiding such concentration 1isk. While neither is immediately
obvious, at least some incentive would exist for at least ceJiain types of
financial institutions to implement this requirement.
The next form of 1isk is reputational risk. Reputational risk is lisle
caused by events adversely affecting the reputation of an enterprise,
pmiicularly a financial institution. 136 Banking regulators have long
hypothesized that known or assumed use of banks by criminals could result
in adverse consequences as customers and investors react by shmming the
institution. Reputational risk also faces other persons, financial and
nonfinancial. 137 Although discussing sanctions against Iran rather than
money laundeling and terrorism financing per se, Stuart Levey, the Under
Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence under President Bush
and now President Obama, suggested that "financial institutions want to
identifY and avoid dangerous or risky customers who could harm their
reputations and business." 138 Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary Daniel
Glaser fmiher noted that "rather than comply with just the letter of the law,
we have seen many in the banking industry voluntarily go beyond their
legal requirements because they do not want to handle illicit business." 139
Therefore, implementation of anti-money laundering and terrorism
financing standards by banks could have direct financial benefits by
avoiding such reputational risks.
However, actually demonstrating such reputational risk has proven
difficult. Preliminary studies by Professors Michael Levi and Peter Reuter
of stock price fluctuations following news stolies on the use of banks by
money launderers show no change in stock p1ice from those stmies. 140
While additional research is needed, there is doubt that financial
institutions and DNFBP would weigh heavily concems over reputational
risk.

136. "Reputational risk is defined as the potential that adverse publicity regarding a bank's business
practices and associations, whether accurate or not, will cause a loss of confidence in the integrity of the
institution." BASEL COMM., CUSTOMER DUE DILIGENCE, supra note 134, at para. I I. The loss of high
quality borrowers reduces profitable loans and increases the risk of the overall Joan portfolio.
Depositors may also withdraw their funds, thereby reducing an inexpensive source of funding for the
banlc SCHOTT, REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 9, at II-5.
137. THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNJT, REPUTATION: RISK OF RISKS 2 (2005) (arguing that
maintaining a good reputation is the most important and difficult task facing senior risk managers).
138. Quoted in Orde F. Kittrie, NeH' Sanctions for a New Centwy: Treasury's Innovative Use of
Financial Sanctions, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 789,816-17 (2009).
139. Jd.
140. Michael Levi, Lecture to International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C. (2003).
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There is a second issue related to reputational risk: the concern that
the profiling, monitoring, and suspicious transaction reporting requirements
as outlined in the FATF Recommendations may not be effective even if
141
properly implemented. If they were not, there would be little reputational
risk benefit to spending money to implement them. And, as discussed
earlier, there is strong indication that many fmancial institutions do not
believe that financial intelligence units or other governmental authorities
make much use of suspicious activity reports. 142
While there is speculation as to the effects of reputational risk in
incentivizing fmancial institutions to implement their preventive measures
responsibilities, there may also be significant disincentives. Financial
institutions may see a benefit in being known to be lax in implementing
anti-money laundering duties in that they may attract criminal clients who
wish to avoid being caught. 143 Much of the current stmggle by developed
countries to eliminate bank secrecy in offshore financial centers has
focused on this perceived benefit to financial institutions that offer
locations to hide c1iminal proceeds, such as in tax evasion. 144 It is by no
means certain which incentive, the downside risk of a bad reputation or the
upside risk of a bad reputation, is stronger.
The next important form of risk is operational risk, which is defined as
the potential for loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes,
people and systems, or external events. 145 Clearly, at least within the
standard cost-benefit analytical framework, implementing those aspects of
preventive measures that assist in uncovering fi·aud would be in the best
interests of the private party. Unfortunately little publicly available
information exists on how financial institutions and DNFBP seek to
prevent financial fraud, an issue that is not addressed in anti-money
laundering evaluations. A major reason for the absence of such information
is concern by private parties over protecting propriety systems and concern
over competition. 146 However, insight into anti-fiaud client identification

141. This issue is discussed inji·a in Pati III.
142. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
143. This argument applies only to money laundering and not terrorism financing, where adverse
reputation is likely to be far greater than any possible financial benefits from having ten·orists as clients.
But that's just a guess.
144. See Gordon, 011 the Use a11d Abuse of Standards for Law, supra note 15, at 515-18, 563-64;
see also Linnley Browning, Swiss Banker Blows Whistle on Tax Evasion, N.Y. TIMES, January 18,
2010, at B1 (describing political fallout over the use by U.S. citizens of Swiss banks to engage in tax
evasion).
145. BASEL COMM., CUSTOMER DUE DILIGENCE, supra note 134, at para. 12.
146. This absence of information is similar to problems in identifying information on how the
private sector implements preventive measures. See inji-a notes 195-202 and accompanying text.
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and account monitoring can be gained from examining systems provided
by third party services to financial institutions. One of the largest advertises
a "Dynamic Multidimensional Risk-Weighted Suspicious Activities
Detector to thoroughly monitor all transactions and quickly detect
fi·audulent activities with the utmost accuracy." 147 According to
promotional materials, the anti-fi·aud system is capable of sharing the same
server and database with its anti-money laundering system, but is separate
and different. 148
That being noted, fraud committed against a financial institution and
money laundering and tenorism financing implemented by a financial
institution are quite different. In the first instance the financial institution is
the victim; in the second, the financial institution is the medium through
which the crime is perpetrated. 149 The vast majority of criminal proceeds do
not involve fraud against banks. 150 While there are many possible origins of
tenorism financing, bank fraud is only one of them and is unlikely to be a
significant source. 151 For that reason, one would expect financial
institutions and DNFBP to focus not on money laundering or tenorism
financing risks, but on those that directly adversely affect them, lilce
fi·aud. 152 A key aspect of any anti-fraud program found in a preventive
measure is the identification and profiling of potential clients and
employees. Among the most common fom1 of customer fraud against

147. This includes check fraud, check kiting, ATM fraud, wire transfer fraud, credit card fraud,
debit card fraud, stored valued card fraud, commercial loan fraud, consumer loan fraud, mortgage Joan
fraud, online banking fraud, point of sales fraud, trading fraud, insurance fraud, identity fraud,
employee fraud, and vendor fraud. See generally Guardian Officer, GLOBALV!SJON SYSTEMS,
http://www.gv-systems.com/. According to a sales representative, the algorithms for fraud detection and
money laundering/terrorism financing detection are "significantly different." Telephone interview with
John Smith, Cleveland, OH (Feb. 20, 201 0).
148. !d.
149. IMF, FJNANCJAL SYSTEM ABUSE, FINANCIAL CRIME AND MONEY LAUNDERJNGBACKGROUND PAPER 40 (2001), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/ml/2001/eng/021201.pdf
[hereinafter IMF, MONEY LAUNDERING BACKGROUND PAPER].
150. PETER REUTER & EDWIN M. TRUMAN, CHASING DIRTY MONEY: THE FIGHT AGAINST MONEY
LAUNDERJNG 22 (2004) [hereinafter REUTER & TRUMAN, THE FIGHT].
151. See COUNTERJNG THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM 91-206 (Thomas J. Biersteker & Sue E.
Eckert eds., 2008).
!52. "Banks are called upon to identify 'proceeds of crime' when all they can concretely observe
are account transactions. The issue then for them is to develop criteria capable of identifying deviant
dealings . . . . More sophisticated software provides detailed background information on clients and
account movements. These instmments have also set the criteria for defirring undesirable clients or
atypical financial operations. The problem is that you have to be sure to target what you want to obtain,
and adjust the parameters accordingly." Gilles Favarel-Garrigues, Thierry Godefroy, & Pierre
Lascoumes, Sentinels in the Banking Jnduslly: Private Actors and the Fight against 111oney Laundering
in France, 48 BRJTJSH J. CRJM. 3, 6 (2008).
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banks are creditor fraud and wire and check fraud. 153 Simple background
checks could identifY persons known to have engaged in such activity. In
addition to identifying known fraudsters, financial institutions may be able
to monitor types of customers and transactions to uncover known
fraudulent patterns. For example, one recent creditor fraud involved people
posing as wealthy dentists who took out loans to purchase speed boats. The
fraudsters forged various documents including titles to non-existent boats,
which they used for secmity to obtain the loans. Once this scheme was
uncovered in one of the bank's branches the bank was able to uncover
similar schemes in other branches. 154 The bank had every incentive to
uncover such frauds against the banlc These incentives do not, however,
extend to possible money laundering or tenorism financing.
Fraud detection can be assisted by sharing doubts about client bona
fides with financial intelligence units. Their access to extensive databases
including police records, immigration and customs records, tax records,
and supervismy findings 155 make them particularly effective at uncovering
fraud patterns among large numbers of financial transactions among
different financial institutions. As a result, some units, including FinCEN,
are tasked not only with anti-money laundering and tenorism financing
duties but also with preventing fraud against financial institutions. The
difference between repmiing possible fraud and possible money laundering
or tenorism financing is demonstrated by examining the types of reporis
filed to financial intelligence units. For example, in the United States, a
significant percentage of suspicious transaction repmis filed with FinCEN
are not concerned with money laundering or tenorism financing but with
possible fraud, and are identified as such on the report. 156
While additional research needs to be undertaken there does appear to
be some significant anti-fraud benefit to financial institutions and DNFBP
in client identification and client profiling. There may also be some benefit
to monitoring transactions to see if they fit any lmown pattems indicating
fraud, and to report those to financial intelligence units. However, this
!53. [MF, MONEY LAUNDERING BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 149, at 40. While there is far less
information with respect to other types of financial institutions, preventive measures mles and financial
intelligence units have also assisted in uncovering insurance and securities fraud, including insider
trading and market manipulation. See FinCEN, Banlc Secrecy Act Records Lead to Funds for
Restitution in Insurance Fraud, available at http://www.fincen.gov/law_enforcement/ss/html/014.html;
see also FATF, Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in the Securities Sector 48- 53 (2009),
amilable at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/32/31/43948586.pdf.
154. Confidential interview with banlc compliance officer in Cleveland, OF-I (Apr. 12, 2009).
155. l!v!F, FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS, supra note 71, at 58.
156. Of the reports filed by depositoty institutions nearly 400,000 were for money laundering and
terrDiism financing, while around 300,000 related to financial institution fraud. FinCEN SAR Reviews,
supra note 19, at 4.
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would not usually extend to client identification or transaction monitoring
to detect money laundering or terrorism financing.
The last possible risk to be avoided, legal or regulatory risk, arises
from the possibility that financial institutions and DNFBP may suffer
enforcement actions such as fines and criminal liabilities for breaching
anti-money laundering or terrorism financing laws or regulations. 157
However, these are risks for failure to implement burdens imposed by the
state for law enforcement purposes, not imposed to benefit the financial
institution. 158 There would be direct benefits to financial institutions and
DNFBP if they paid fewer fines, but this would have to be balanced against
the costs of implementing preventive measures, including indirect costs.
However, the application of sanctions against customers creates a
strong disincentive to repmi possible laundering. As noted, a principal
public benefit of anti-money laundering rules is that they ailow the
confiscation of criminal proceeds. 159 If such proceeds are on deposit or
otherwise loaned to or invested in a financial institution or DNFBP, the
confiscation of those proceeds would actually injure that enterprise by
depriving it of capital. This could be a significant indirect cost. The larger
the magnitude of the proceeds, the greater would be the injury to the
enterprise. Given this potentially significant incentive, a purely profitmaximizing financial institution or DNFBP would seek to follow their
preventive measures obligations only as far as to avoid sanctions for noncompliance, but would stop short of the point where they detected and
repmied actual money laundering, at least with respect to criminal proceeds
that form part of the enterprise's capital base.
On balance, there is strong suggestion that financial institutions and
DNFBP will see risk-reduction benefits from implementing customer
identification and profiling rules and some from fraud-related transaction
monitming and reporting. However, there appears to be no obvious net
self-benefit for anti-money laundering transaction monitoring or reporting.
Given cost considerations, theory would suggest that private actors would
keep costs down and benefits up by concentrating on those aspects that
benefit primarily fraud efforts rather than anti-money launde1ing and
teno1ism fmancing efforts.
There are significant costs associated with unfunded mandates of antimoney laundering and terrorism financing preventive measures, many of
which also go to the question of capacity to implement such measures.
BASEL COMM., CUSTOMER DUE DILIGENCE, supra note 134, at para. 13.
Richard Gordon, Anti-money-laundering Policies: Selected Legal, Political, and Economic
issues, I CURRENT DEV. IN MONETARY & FIN. L. 405, 407 (1999).
159. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
157.

158.
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Exactly how much is difficult to quantify. 160 At least with respect to banks,
transaction monitoring appears to be the greatest area of expenditure. 161
Given that transaction monitoring appears to provide little direct benefit to
the financial institution itself (that is, compared to customer identification
and profiling, which may help prevent fraud), this does not bode well for
implementation.
In an increasing number of instances, financial institutions outsource
at least some preventive measure duties, particularly review of client names
for profiling purposes, transaction monitoring, and suspicious transaction
identification, resulting in what one commentator has referred to as a
"cottage industry of consultants." 162 Such outsourcing can have advantages,
such as reducing costs through economies of scale and improving quality
through competition. 163 However, smaller institutions may be buying
scaled-down "anti-money laundering lite" software, 164 which may not be a
good sign with respect to effective implementation. At any rate,
implementation costs certainly must have a negative effect on
implementation when placed into the cost/benefit considerations of
financial institutions and DNFBP.
That being said, unfunded mandates do have the benefit of shifting
costs from the public to the private sector. This can have some benefits, as
well as some potential downsides that will be discussed at greater length
below. 165
As noted earlier, there are significant potential regulatmy incentives to
compliance. 166 However, these incentives, based on fines and other fonns
of compliance action, have been applied to failures to implement basic
requirements (such as no customer identification system, no profiling
system, no transaction monitoring). 167 None appears to have been based on
a results-focused failure of the system. It is therefore not obvious how these
160. Various attempts have been made, however. According to some estimates U.S. banks spent
about $125 million both in 2003 and 2004 to comply. High-end estimates have placed the total costs of
compliance at $7 billion in 2003. Zaring & Baylis, Bureaucracy to War, supra note 70, at 1413.
Presumably these costs have increased. See also Sorcher, Lost In Implementation, supra note 3, at 396
(noting that banks have significantly increased their spending on AMLICFT procedures).
161. K.PMG, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING SURVEY, supra note 103, at 8.
162. Zaring & Baylis, Bureaucracy to War, supra note 70, at 1413.
163. Because the purveyors of private services must persuade their customers to purchase from
them they have an incentive to offer a better price/quality mix than others BENSON, To SERVE AND
PROTECT, supra note 120, at 27. This suggests greater risk taking and perhaps innovation as well as
greater quality control and lower costs of through greater efficiencies. !d.
164. See Adams, Diligence is Getting Pretty Pricey, supra note 88.
165. See infi·a notes 189-194 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
167. !d.
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would incentivize financial institutions to implement effective preventive
measures. As a result, with unclear and subjective written requirements,
often unhelpful guidance and feedback, and a lack of clear incentives for
effectiveness, one would expect that financial institutions and DNFBP
would not to do a pmiicularly good job in implementing preventive
measures. As will be discussed in Part II, this is very different from how
the private sector implements its tax administration duties, where
requirements are not only clearly stated but where incentives for
effectiveness are quite clear.
As noted earlier, neither compliance reports nor sanctions rep01ied by
supervisory authorities discuss in any detail the design of compliance
systems. 168 Financial institutions and DNFBP also do not publicize exactly
how they implement these requirements. 169 However, some commentators
have provided a list of actions that private firms could take to implement
their preventive measures duties in the most effective mam1er possible. 170
This "wish list" is not a description of what finns actually implementonly what they could implement assuming that cost was no object. Among
. l"nk
. 171
t bese lS
1
ana1YS!S.
Linlc analysis is a technique used to find associations within data that
might have relevance to the particular research question. 172 Link analysis
explores associations within collections of data. 173 Increasing the number of
r

168. !d.
169. An important barrier to learning more about how firms actually implement their preventive
measures requirements is a concern over protecting proprietary infonnation in the context of
competitive concerns. Confidential interviews conducted with compliance officers at numerous
financial institutions in the United States, Hong Kong, The British Virgin Islands, and the Philippines
over the past five years. See also PricewaterhouseCoopers, Anti-Money Laundering ("AML") and A.ntiTetTorist Financing ("ATF"): Case Study, available at http://www.pwt.com/lulen/anti-moneylaundering/case.jhtml (providing almost no detail on preventive measures system recommended by
outside consultant).
170. G. S. Vidyashankar, Rajesh Natarajan, Subhrangshu Sanyal, Mine Your Way to Combat
Money Laundering, Part 1, DM Review Special Report, October 2007, available at
http://www .infomlation-management.com/specialreports/20071 002/1 093412-l.html
[hereinafter
Vidyashankar et a/., Mine Your Way Part 1]; G. S. Vidyashankar, Rajesh Natarajan, Subhrangshu
Sanyal, Mine Your Way to Combat Money Laundering, Part 2, DM Review Special Report, October
2007, available at http://www.infonnation-management.com/specialreports/20071 00911 093416-l.html
[hereinafter Vidyashankar eta/., Mine Your Way Part 2].
171. Vidyashankar et a/., Mine Your Way Part 1, supra note 170; Vidyashankar et a/., Mine Your
Way Part 2, supra note 170.
172. Cuellar, Criminal Law, supra note 3, at 368.
173. FINCEN, FEASIBILITY OF A CROSS-BORDER ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER REPORTING
SYSTEM UNDER THE BANK SECRECY ACT 10 (October 2006), available at http://www.fincen.gov/
news_room/rp/files/CBFTFS _Complete. pdf [hereinafter FINCEN, CROSS-BORDER ELECTRONIC
FUNDs]; see also Cuellar, supra note 3, at 368. Much of the information in the following two
paragraphs has been provided by Boudewijn Verhelst. Verhelst e-mail, supm note 20.
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data sets available increases the number and types of links that can be
identified.
There are a number of different types of data set that could be helpful
in money laundering or terrorism financing linlc analysis. First, personal
and financial data (including personal and businesses names, addresses,
phone numbers, names of beneficial owners and controllers, bank accounts,
deposits, funds transfers) would linlc people and businesses through their
financial transactions. For example, this can establish that person A has a
relationship with company B and person C.
Next, descriptive links can be established with data bases that describe
the type of business activities nonnally conducted by the persons within the
linlc. Such data includes customer identification/profiles and other
infonnation such as that which is found in business directories like Dunn
and Bradstreet. Links to data that include money laundering or terrorism
financing indictors, such as law enforcement data, case files, or suspicious
transaction repmis, can also be made.
Once such descriptive links are established, further analysis can
examine whether a transaction between identified persons looks unusual or
suspicious. For example, if person A has a criminal record or has made past
suspicious transactions, payments to company B or C could raise suspicion
that they constitute criminal proceeds or laundeting. This suspicion could
be raised further if person A owns or controls company B and company B
itself has no known business. If C has a record as a tenorist or tenorist
organization, a suspicion might be raised that the payments were to finance
terrorism. Obviously, the greater the amount of relevant data and data
types, the more extensive will be the link analysis. However, financial
institutions and DNFBP are restticted in their access to some useful data
sets, an issue that will be discussed below. As will be seen in Pmi II, link
analysis is used with great effectiveness by the public sector in tax
administration.
Such use of descriptive links and analysis is also desctibed as data
mining and the use of algorithms. 174 Such algorithms can be based on
typical laundeting typologies or "red flag" indicators provided by
supervisory authorities and the Financial Action Task Force. However, as
will be discussed below, such algorithms appear to be based on
idiosyncratic judgment rather than empitically sustainable classifications. 175
Empirically derived algorithms are based on regression analysis or
discriminant function analysis. Regression analysis is a technique for

174. Vidyashankar eta!., Mine Your Way Pmt 2, supra note 170.
175. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 92-101 (2003).
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discovering the relationship between a dependent variable and one or more
independent variables. It explains how the value of the dependent variable
changes when one of the independent variables is changed. This change in
the dependent variable can also be reflected in a probability distribution.
Typically, one begins with a hypothesis that the presence and magnitude or
a particular factor (the independent vmiable) is a predictor of something
(the dependent variable). One then tests the hypothesis using factual data
and statistical analysis. 176 For example, a dependent variable could be "the
likelihood that money launde1ing or teiTorism financing is involved in a
particular transaction." The independent variables could then be some
quantifiable aspect of the customer or transaction, say, one of the factors
found in money laundering or tenorism financing typologies or in the list
of "red flags." A statistical analysis would then show if the hypolhesis is
conect and indicate the magnih1de of relationship between the presence of
a "red flag" and the likelihood that there was money laundering or tenorism
finance. Multiple independent variables can be statistically combined in
non-linear regression analysis to create multi-variable probabilities.
Another way of determining the relationship between a dependent and
independent vmiables is discriminant function analysis. Here, however, the
analysis detennines which variables discriminate between two or more
naturally occurring groups. It also uses a statistical analysis based on
empirical data. 177 For example, the group could be "those who launder
money or finance tenorism," while the variables could be the same
typology factors or red flags in the previous example. Multiple variables
can be employed and predictor variables can be expressed in magnitudes.
Obviously these two analytical techniques would be supe1ior to
assessments made on human hunches or "idiosyncratic assessments" that
have no proven statistical accuracy .178 As will be seen in Part II, link
disc1iminant function analysis is used with great effectiveness by at least
some tax administrations.
Given that typologies and red flags that supervisory authorities and
others provide do not appear to be scientifically derived, it seems unlikely
that private firms, which are primm·ily concemed about controlling
regulatmy/legal risk, would themselves use regression analysis. In addition,

176. See generally Alan 0. Sykes, An Introduction to Regression Analysis, in CHICAGO LECTURES
lN LAW & ECONOMICS (Eric Posner ed., 2000), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/
20.Sykes_.Regression.pdf (describing linear and non-linear regression analysis).
177. See generalZv John Poulsen & Aaron French, Discriminant Function Analysis (2003),
available at http://userwww .sfsu.edu/-efc/classes/biol71 0/discrim/discrim. pdf (describing discriminant
function analysis).
178. SCHAUER, supra note 175, at 92.
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private sector entttles lack access to impmiant data sets, such as
confidential data from other financial institutions and DNFBP and private
or classified government data (discussed below in Section 4). Also,
managing large sets of data is simply difficult to do. 179
As noted above at least some financial institutions contract out some
of their customer identification and client monitoring programs to third
party service providers. 180 A review of some of their programs provides
some insight into services offered. For example, some finns assist in
customer identification and profiling by providing a risk screening service
181
to check individual or entity names against a comprehensive data set.
Finns can also supply transaction monitoring services. One finn "monitors
and detects" suspicious transactions "across all business lines" using na
fully integrated dynamic and adaptive multidimensional intelligent engine
[which] detects suspicious activities" using "risk modeling" and "risk-based
algorithmsn to "analyze and investigate suspicious activities effectively and
efficiently." 182 But as contractors to those primarily responsible for
implementing preventive measures, there is little reason to believe that such
third party provider firms would be motivated to provide scientificallybased algmitluns based on regression or discriminant function analysis.
This would only raise costs without providing a service that would further
reduce regulatory or legal risk.
Inespective of what the best firms offer, only some financial
institutions and perhaps DNFBP use such services, and some contract for
"lite" versions. 183 Exactly why some financial instihttions and DNFBP use
contractors is not entirely clear. For some firms it could be a fom1 of
regulatmy/legal risk "insurance"; as long as a well-regarded third party
vendor is a contractor it is likely that supervisors will not sanction finns for
.
184
non-camp1ranee.
Ptivate sector entities appear to file far too many suspicious
transaction reports, providing a huge flow of false positives. If a financial
institution is usually sanctioned for failure to report suspicious transactions
(false negatives) and not for reporting too many that do not tum out to be
suspicious (false positives), there will be an incentive for financial
179. Vidyashankar eta!., Mille Your Way Part 2, supra note 170 ("Analysis of such huge volumes
imposes a huge computational burden .... ").
180. See supra notes 162-164 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., World-Check Online, http://v;'WW.world-check.com/online/ (last visited Apr. 6,
2011).
182. American Bankers Association, PATRlOT OFFICER GlobalVision Systems, Inc.,
http://www.aba.com/CAB/cab_patriotofficer.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 20 ll ).
183. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
184. Confidential interviews with compliance officers at financial institutions, supra note 154.
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institutions and DNFBP to apply too little scmtiny and to over-report. 185
Cun-ently, in many key jurisdictions, there have been considerable
increases in suspicious transaction rep01iing. 186 Because so few of these
reports result in actual prosecutions, the result has often been a general
flooding of financial intelligence units with essentially "defensive"
suspicious transaction reports. 187 This can generate infonnation overload
and generally clog the c1iminal investigations system with too many false
positives. 188
There are a few possible other good and bad negative effects. Some
scholars have argued that the p1ivate sector is more likely to act selfinterestedly than the public sector, and if so, the p1ivate sector may be more
likely to commit to a higher level of unethical acts. 189 One type of unethical
act could be racial or other invalid profiling. While profiling based on
purely statistical analysis of empirical data would be helpful in determining
which cus1omers and transactions are more likely to be involved in criminal
activity, profiling based on even inf01med guesswork is far more li..lzely to
result in unfairness. 190 Given that all typologies reports, red flags, and other
185. See generally Elod Takats, A The01y of 'Oying Wolf': The Economics of Money Laundering
Enforcement 4 (Int'l Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 07/81, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/abstract=979035 (laying out a theoretical argument for increasing filings of
defense suspicious activity reports by reporting institutions). Flooding financial intelligence units with
too many repmis could also help bury those that are actually useful, benefiting reverse reputational risk
and protecting client assets from seizure.
186. This conclusion is supported by specific studies of the United States and the United Kingdom.
See Cuellar, supra note 3, at 396 (describing increases in SARing in the United States); STEPHEN
LANDER, SERIOUS ORGANISED CRJMES AGENCY, 13 (2006), available at http://v-'WW.soca.gov.uk/
downloads/SOCAtheSARsReveiw_Fina;_Web.pdf; Michael Levi & Peter Reuter, Maney Laundering,
34 CRIME & JUST. 289,313 (2006).
187. Verhelst e-mail, supra note 20. ("There is no indication that FinCEN ... knows how to
manage all of these reports. In fact, the former director of FinCEN complained in 2004 that too many of
these SARs were being filed by banks. The haphazard nature of the fines that FinCEN has imposed has
Jed some observers to question1whether the agency has a policy in place to sort through each of the
reports."); Zaring & Baylis, supra note 70, at 1415 (citations omitted). According to one source, a
compliance officer in French financial institution noted that if "[y]ou want to stay out of trouble? Then
file a report." Gilles Favarel-Ganignes, Thierry Godefroy, & Pierre Lascoumes, Sentinels in the
Banking Industry, Private Actors and the Fight against Money Laundering in France, 48 BRJT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY I, 11 (2008) [hereinafter Favarel-Garrignes el a/., Private Actors].
188. LANDER, supra note 186; Levi & Reuter, supra note 186, at 313; Fleming, UK Law
Enforcement, supra note 116, at 10, 35-6; REUTER & TRUMAN, THE FIGHT, supra note 150, at 101-2.
189. This is not to suggest that public sector employees are always more ethical, only that they tend
to be more so than the private sector. See Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, supra note 120, at 97879.
190. SCHAUER, supra note 175, at 92-101. Even those who strongly oppose racial profiling for
national secmity purposes do so in part because there is no empirical or statistical basis for the
profiling. See, e.g., Yevgenia S. Kleiner, Racial Profiling in the Name ofNatiana/ Security: Protecting
Minority Travelers' Civil Liberties in the Age of Terrorism, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 103, 138-40
(2010).
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guidance is based on informed guesswork one can reasonably speculate
that financial institutions and DNFBP are using unscientific profiling to
target certain categories of client to avoid the application of sanctions. If
the adversely affected clients provide relatively small profits to the
financial institutions or DNFBP the likelihood that they would simply be
dropped as a client increases dramatically. This may result in reduced
access to the financial system by those clients. 191
One area where there is some evidence that this is happening is with
charities. Special Recommendation VIII suggests that some charities
appeared to be involved in terrorism-financing transactions. This was
emphasized repeatedly in material that could be referenced by financial
institutions, their supervisors, and law enforcement, including FATF
reports and guidance issues by national regulators. 192 There is no reason to
believe that supervisors believe that all charities are somehow tainted. But
if regulated financial institutions and Dl\fFBP believe that having fewer
charity clients will result in less of a chance that sanctions will be applied
to them, fmancial instih1tions and DNFBP may be less likely to accept
them as clients, particularly if they are low-profit clients. Although this
would not be the intent of supervisors, this would reduce charities' access
to the fonnal financial system. There is some evidence that this is in fact
happening. 193 There may be other terrorism-related profiling problems
based on type of name (for example, Muslim) or location (say, the Middle
East).
Next, preventive measures duties must be financed by either
increasing p1ices the institutions charge clients, reducing net profits, or
(most probably) a mix of the two. Higher financial instih1tion p1ices can
have significant and adverse public policy effects, such as decreasing
access to financial services by low income clients. 194

191. For example, some anecdotal evidence suggests financial institutions are accepting fewer
money service businesses as clients; because they cater primarily to the poor this can have an adverse
effect on financial services among poorer people. Confidential Interview with bank compliance officer
in Cleveland, supra note 154.
192. Gordon, Tiysts or Terrorists, supra note 4, at 718-19.
193. See generally Nina J. Crimm, High Alert: The Government's War on the Financing of

Terrorism and Its Implications for Donors, Domestic Charitable Organizations, and Global
Philanthropy, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1341 (2004) (discussing extensively the liabilities imposed by
the U.S. on charitable donations by anti-terrorism financing laws).
194. JENNIFER IS ERN & DAVID PORTEOUS, AML/CFT REGULATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL
SERVICE PROVIDERS THAT SERVE LOW INCOME PEOPLE 9-16 (2005) (discussing how increased costs
due to implementation of AMLICFT regulations may reduce the supply of affordable financial services
to low-income persons).
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4. Objective Capacity
The issue addressed in this section is the private sector's capacity or
access to infmmation needed for it effectively to implement its preventive
measures. Whether state authorities like financial intelligence units have
such capacity and access is addressed in section E.
Financial institutions and DNFBP have access to a considerable
amount of data required for effective implementation of preventive
measures. As a point of access to the financial system, financial institutions
and DNFBP can demand, inspect, and copy client identity documents. 195
They also have access to transactions of their own clients and can easily
keep records of those transactions. 196 Because of relative ease of access to
ce1iain databases such as company registries, business regist1ies (e.g. Dmm
and Bradstreet), court records, and conceivably others, they may be able to
detect false documentation and to make some linlc analysis. 197 Finally,
financial institutions in particular are expert at how to store money, move
it, and guard it. 198 They can use this information in using linlc analysis, and
such knowledge could be used to help develop hypotheses as to how
launderers might hide transactions or beneficial ownership and control. 199
Significant issues concerning lack of capacity and access to data
remain. The first involves determining the beneficial ownership and control
of legal persons and legal arrangements such as trusts. Companies and
trusts are often used for laundering purposes in large part because
disguising ownership and control of the legal person or anangement is
relatively easy? 00 Even though Recommendations 33 and 34 require states
to provide such infonnation to the public, they are often incapable of doing
so. 201 As a result, the identification of beneficial owners and controllers is
often completed in an tmsatisfactory fashion. 202

195. This may be a principal reason that client identification is relatively successful. See supra note

81 and accompanying text.
196. Tllis may be a principal reason that record-keeping is relatively successful. See supra note 80
and accompanying text.
197. Verhelst e-mail, supra note 20.
198. Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, The Mismatch Between Stale Power and State Capacity in
Transnational Law Enforcement, 22 BERKELEY J. lNT'L L. 15, 25 (2004).
199. See discussion of link analysis, data mining, and algorithm development supra notes 174-181
and accompanying text.

200. See generally FATF, THE MISUSE OF CORPORATE VEHICLES, INCLUDING TRUST AND
COMPANY SERVICE PROVIDERS (2006) (describing how corporate vehicles, including tmsts, can be used
to hide beneficial ownership and control, and reviewing how this can be accomplished in various
jurisdictions surveyed).
201. See e.g. U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 34, at 57; AUSTRJA MUTUAL
EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at 221-2, 225; AUSTRALIA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra
note 80, at 121-3; CANADA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at 250, 253; U.K. MUTUAL
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Another key issue involves access to sufficient data to perform
adequate linlc analysis. As noted earlier, successful link analysis depends
on the ability to access as much data as possible. The first problem involves
transaction data. Financial institutions and DNFBP are aware only of the
transactions of their own clients and not of clients of other financial
institutions or DNFBP. If a client engages in a transaction with a client of
another enterprise the chain or linlc is severed. If financial institutions and
DNFBP could share data on transactions with every other financial
institution this problem could theoretically be solved, but concerns over
client confidentiality and proprietary/competitive concerns would make
such information sharing difficult at best, especially with respect to foreign
finns. 203 Even if there were no such concerns, the resulting system would
mean that eve1y person subject to preventive measures would need access
to every other person's customer transaction data base. As a result, every
private sector entity subject to preventive measures would be performing a
linlc analysis with every customer of every other such entity. It would be
difficult to justify the added costs of such a bizarrely redundant system.
The second problem involves access to other data, such as confidential
government data. While it may be possible to anange access to publically
available information on criminal charges and convictions, it would be
difficult if not impossible for private sector entities to have access to tax
records, police records, immigration and customs records, vehicle
registries, and supervisory findings. 204 Also absent would be previously
filed suspicious transaction repmis. Under the Recommendations, such
reports are treated as strictly confidential, not only to protect client's
legitimate privacy interests, but to ensure that there is no tipping off. 205
Next, typologies and red flag indicators may help in designing
algorithms, but if those algorithms are not based on appropriate statistical
analysis they will be of limited use. The private sector does not have access
to key information required by such an empirical scientific approach. The
first and foremost is that they have no, or at least greatly limited, access to
EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at 236, 239; !·lONG KONG CHINA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT;
supra note 80, at 164-5, 167.
202. The author of this Article is currently co-leading a study for the World Bank entitled "The
Misuse of Corporate Vehicles in Grand Comtption Cases: Unraveling the Corporate Veil." A review of
over 200 cases of money laundering using corporate vehicles and tmsts suggests that accurate
identification of ownership and control was rarely successful. See World Bank, Component 1 Analytical
Spreadsheet (February I, 2010), on file with the author of this Article.
203. Sharing client information with both domestic and foreign law enforcement authorities is
another matter. FATF 40 Recommendations, supra note 3, at Recommendation 40; Methodology, supra
note 10, atCriterinn 40.4.1.
204. Verhelst e-mail, supra note 20.
205. FATF 40 Recommendations, supra note 3, at Recommendation 14.
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the dependent variable: a higher probability of money laundering or
tenorism financing. In fact, a principal complaint of financial institutions
and DNFBP is that they receive no feedback as to whether their suspicious
transaction reports are false positives (i.e. result in no further
investigations, prosecutions, or convictions) or are in any way useful in
uncovering criminal proceeds or terrorism financing. 206 Without this most
basic fonn of feedback, it is impossible to determine if a hypotheses about
connections between independent variables identified as indicating a higher
likelihood of laundering or terrorism finance is accurate. This relates to a
second problem conceming general capacity rather than access to data.
While financial institutions and at least some DNFBP have expertise in
financial transactions, there is no reason to believe that they are experts in
criminal investigations. 207 This raises considerable doubt that they would
be able to form the necessary hypotheses between dependent and
independent variables, let alone test them.
5. Other Issues
On the other hand, there is an obvious benefit to requiring the private
sector to take over public sector duties for no fee: costs, especially visible
costs, are shifted from the public budget. This frequently has political
benefits, even if the result is expressed in higher private sector p1ices.
There may be other cost-savings involved in private unfunded mandates?08
We do not know if these were a motivation behind the setting up of the
cunent system. Another reason may be that the private sector has better, or
at least more easily obtainable, access to certain key infom1ation than does
the public sector. 209
There is one other key issue. The fact that the public sector does not
use empi1ically-based algorithms means there are no specified independent
206. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL, JUSTICE, FREEDOM AND SECURITY: FINAL
REPORT ON FEEDBACK 30, 53 (2007). See, e.g., AUSTRIA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note
80, at 144 (no up-to-date guidance); AUSTRALIA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at 90
(inadequate feedback on suspicious transaction reports filed); CANADA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT,
supra note 80, at 262 (no feedback on suspicious transaction reports filed) U.K. MUTUAL EVALUATION
REPORT, supra note 80, at 148 (no direct feedback); but see HONG KONG CHINA MUTUAL EVALUATION
REPORT, supra note 80, at 132 (reporting entity told if suspicious transaction report is subject to further
investigation and/or analysis; the reporting entity is be advised of the outcome in due course); KPMG
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING SURVEY, supra note I 04, at 8.
207. Gordon, T1ysts or Ten·01·ists, supra note 4, at 737.
208. Though one commentator has suggested that there may be instances where there are overall
costs savings with unfunded government mandates. David A. Dana, The Case far Unjimded
Environmental Mandates, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 36-38 (1995).
209. This is not unique to preventive measures implementation. See, e.g., Fisher, Privatizing
Regulation, supra note 124, at 141; William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring
Devices in Government Contracting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1799, 1821 (1996).
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variables that trigger investigations. If there were, and these were known by
money launderers and terrorists, they could change their tactics and
patterns (i.e. their independent variables) to reduce the likelihood that they
would be investigated and, therefore, caught.
E. Public Sector Successes and Failures
The principal purpose of the financial intelligence unit is to analyze
suspicious transaction reports and other relevant data to establish whether
the data contained in the reports provides a sufficient basis to warrant
transmitting the file for further investigation or for prosecution. 2 l 0 Through
examination and analysis, the financial intelligence tmit attempts to
distinguish truly suspect transactions from those that are only "benignly"
unusual. 211 In effect, the financial intelligence unit must detem1ine which
"suspicious" reports are really suspicious.
Dividing the task of detennining suspicious and really suspicious
transactions between the private sector and public financial intelligence
units usually begins with the receipt of a suspicious transaction report, after
which the financial intelligence unit engages in a two-part analysis. In the
first part, known as tactical analysis, the financial intelligence unit looks for
additional information on the persons and transactions involved or other
elements involved in a pmticular case to provide the basis for fmther
analysis.m A key element of such tactical analysis is linlc analysis, which
has been discussed at length above in the context of transaction monitoring
and suspicious transaction reporting. Financial intelligence units typically
have available various types of data, including those publically available
databases to which the private sector has access. 213 It can also have access
to databases to which the public has no access, such as tax records, police
records, inunigration and customs . records, vehicle registries, and
.
fimd"mgs.-?[ 4
supervlSOlY
Largely because the private sector has little difficulty in identifying
clients and maintaining records of transactions, financial intelligence units
have little difficulty in obtaining such records. However, in most instances,
these records are obtained only by request. 2 l 5 The same is true with respect
to similar infonnation from private sector persons m foreign

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

SCHOTT, REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 9, at VII.
!d.
!d. at VII-6 to 7; IMF, FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS, supra note 71, at 57-58.
See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
Verhelst e-mail, supra note 20.
FATF 40 Recommendations, supra note 3, at Recommendation 10.
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jurisdictions. 216 In other words, these transactions are not part of a data set
that is directly accessible to financial intelligence units. This drastically
cuts down on infonnation available to financial intelligence units, whether
for link analysis or data mining and algotithm development.
There are a few exceptions to this general rule. First, although not
required under the Recommendations, the United States, Canada, and
Australia, as well as some developing countries like the Philippines, require
automatic reporting of certain types of financial transactions to financial
intelligence units. 217 One type of transaction that results in automatic
reporting is cash transactions, which require financial institutions or
DNFBP to report all cash transactions greater than a ce1iain amount. There
are good reasons for having such a rule. In the paradigm case of laundering
the proceeds of illegal drug sales, traffickers tend to be paid in cash. 218 In
order to avoid use of large amounts of cash (which can be bullcy and can
invite unwanted attention) the criminal needs to enter the cash into the
fmmal financial system via a financial institution. Doing so is refened to as
the "placement stage." 219 One of the first anti-money launde1ing principles
was to require financial institutions (especially banks, which are usually the
point of entry in the financial system for cash) to identify exactly who their
customers were and to repoti to the authorities whenever a customer
deposited a substantial amount of cash. 220 The United States, for example,
has long had automatic cash transaction reporting rules (for amounts in
excess of$ 10,000), as have a number of other countries. 221 Another type of
automatic rep01iing is international wire transactions. A number of
jurisdictions, including Canada and Australia, require financial institutions
to report to their financial intelligence units either transactions above a
ce1iain sum (Canada) 222 or all transactions regardless of amotmt

216. FA TF 40 Recommendations, supra note 3, at Recommendation 40; Methodology, supra note
10, at Criterion 40.4.1.
217. U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 34, at 148; CANADA MUTUAL EVALUATION
REPORT, supra note 80, at 159; AUSTRALIA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at 86-87;
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: DETAILED ASSESSMENT REPORT ON ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND
COMB AT!NG THE FINANCING OF TERRORJSM 145 (2009) (copy on file with the author).
218. See supra note 4.
219. SCHOTT, REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 9, at I-7.
220. Gordon, Tiysts or Terrorists, supra note 4, at 708.
221. U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 34, at 148.
222. The Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) collects
repmis related to any cross-border electronic funds transfer in an amount of $10,000 (CAN) or more.
CANADA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at 159. See also FINTRAC, What Must be
Reported? Electronic Funds Transfer, available at
http://www.fintrac-canafe.gc.ca/reporting-declaration/Info/rptEFT-eng.asp.

550

DUKE JOURNAL OF COtvlPARATIVE

& fNTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol21:503

(Australia). 223 An analysis by FinCEN suggested that such data, by
extending link analysis, can have significant benefits in uncovering
laundering. 224 FinCEN recently proposed a regulation requiring such
reporting in the United States. 225 FinCEN sought to address concerns of
reporting persons that such repmiing would significantly raise costs in part
by calling for "increasing the use of technology to automate and
standardize the transfer of data from financial instih1tions, FinCEN, and
law enforcement agencies." 226
Following tactical linlc analysis, the financial intelligence unit
typically unde1iakes operational analysis. Operational analysis uses tactical
information to formulate different hypotheses on the possible activities of
the suspect to produce operational intelligence for use by investigators. It
uses:
all sources of information available to the Fill [financial intelligence
unit] to produce activity patterns, new targets, relationships among the
subject and his or her accomplices, investigative leads, criminal
profiles, and-where possible-indications of possible future
behavior. One of the teclmiques of operational analysis used in some
financial intelligence units is financial profiling. 227

Based on such analysis, the financial intelligence unit may or may not
disseminate a report for further investigation. 228
Another important function of the financial intelligence unit is
strategic analysis, or developing relevant knowledge on techniques of
latmdering or terrorism financing. Examples include "the identification of
evolving criminal patterns in a pmiicular group or the provision of broad
insights into emerging patterns of criminality. "229 The financial intelligence
unit can then use these for its own operational analysis of suspicious
transaction repmis through linking as well as to develop guidelines,

223. AUSTRALlA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at 86; see also AUSTRAC,
International jimds transfer instructions, available at http://www.austrac.gov.au/inter_funds_transfer
.html.
224. FinCEN, CROSS-BORDER ELECTRONIC FUNDS, supra note 72, at 5-l 0.
225. Cross-Border Electronic Transmittals of Funds, 75 Fed. Reg. 60,377 (proposed Sept. 30,
2010).
226. !d. at 60,3 78.
2"27. IMF, FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS, supra note 71, at 59.
228. !d. at 60.
229., SCHOTT, REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 9, at VII-7; !MF, FINANCIAL lNTELUGENCE UNITS,
supra note 71, at 59-60.
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typologies etc. for use by financial institutions and DNFBP. 230 This
generally follows the system used by FinCEN in the United States. 231
However, as is the case with the private sector, financial intelligence
units do not use regression analysis or discriminant function analysis to test
hypotheses. 232 One of the reasons they may not do so is that regression
analysis or discriminant analysis require knowledge of the independent as
well as the dependent variables. Although financial intelligence lmits can
request and receive records on specific transactions, they do not
automatically have access to all h·ansactions. Because financial intelligence
units do not use these analytical tools, methodologies and "red flags" are
made on human hunches or "idiosyncratic assessments" that have no
proven statistical accuracy. 233 As noted earlier, Part II will discuss how
some tax administrations use statistical analysis to select income taxpayers
and retums for audit.
Another failure of fmancial intelligence units is their interaction with
the private sector. They provide inadequate feedback, including assistance
in designing preventive measures systems or data on the usefulness of
suspicious activity reports. Typologies and red flags are not based on
scientific analysis. 234 Exactly why they do not is open to some speculation.
Perhaps the most likely reason for not assisting in the design of preventive
measures systems is that they do not know the best designs. They are not,
after all, in the business of designing such systems but only of analyzing
suspicious transaction repmis. Most impmiantly, they do not have access to
all financial transaction data, which is needed to design such systems
effectively. It may also be that if they provide too much information on
how to find potential launderers and terrorists to the private sector, that
infonnation might get back to the actual launderers and tenmists. In other
words, the system as it now stands is inherently conh·adictory: the private
sector needs the financial intelligence unit's knowledge to design and
implement effective preventive measures systems, but the financial
intelligence unit dare not provide too much infonnation for fear of such
infonnation actually helping criminals and tenorists.
F. Summary and Conclusions
Preventive measures for money laundering and terrorism financing
have not worked well. This is because the cunent system is based on a
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

IMF, FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS, supra
U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT,

note 71, at 60.
supra note 34, at126-35.

Verhelsl e-mail, supra note 20.
SCHAUER, supra note 175, at 92.
See supra text accompanying note 182.
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faulty themy of how such duties should be divided. The preventive
measures standard-by requiring financial institutions and DNFBP to
design and implement requirements that are poorly described, expensive,
and unfunded-invites failure. Given that the private sector's main motive
is profit, theory would predict that it would seek to reduce its costs by
spending as little as possible on implementing those requirements. Because
of their subjective nature, it is possible for the private sector to define
downward its duties without fear of sanction. In addition, the requirements
describe a mandate that the private sector has little objective capacity to
implement, even if it wanted to.
The Recommendations are, with respect to designing and
implementing a profiling, monitoring, and suspicious transaction reporting
system, too vague and subjective. Also, there is little feedback or assistance
from the public sector in refining these responsibilities. While it is no doubt
possible to make the wording clearer, as well as to implement improved
guidance and feedback it is difficult to see how to make the system itself
significantly less subjective and open to interpretation. Govemments, by
having put the burden of designing these systems on to the private sector,
have never had to perform the necessary research and analysis to come up
with effective systems themselves, suggesting they probably do not now
have adequate expertise and essential data to do so. And even if they did,
they cannot provide too much infmmation for fear of such infonnation
actually helping criminals and tenorists. This inherent contradiction in the
system makes a resolution more or less impossible.
As long as system design and implementation is an unfunded private
mandate, incentives will tend to militate in favor of a less expensive and
therefore less comprehensive or effective system. In theory it might be
possible to pay the p1ivate sector by offering bounties for success, meaning
for suspicious transaction reports that lead to further investigations, and
perhaps to eliminate the perceived safe harbor for filing false positives.
However, these could be expensive and could act as a detenent to filing
suspicious transaction reports.
One theoretical possibility would be to de-privatize the system,
tuming it over to the public sector to design and implement. By tuming all
analytical tasks to the public sector, there would be no need for the private
sector to design or implement a selection system. The cunent system
requires the govemment to examine reports from the private sector and
dete1mine which of those reports should be further investigated; in effect,
to detetmine which "suspicious" reports are really suspicious. Dividing
these tasks between the private sector and public financial intelligence units
is inherently inefficient. Eliminating the division would address the
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problem. In the current system, each individual private party has access to
its own client databases but not to that of any other private party, and
concems over confidentiality, competition, and massive redundancy makes
the possibility of sharing such databases highly unlikely. Next, private
parties do not have access to confidential databases that financial
intelligence units have. Finally, while financial intelligence units have
access to those databases, they do not have access to the various private
sector client transaction databases, except in certain instances such as cash
or international wire reporting. This problem could be solved, at least with
respect to domestic private parties, if the system of linlc analysis were to be
de-privatized and all client identification and financial transactions were to
be reported to state financial intelligence units. It may also be easier to
define with clarity and objectivity such a private sector responsibility,
obviating many of the problems of subjectivity that ctmently exist with the
cunent system of privatized obligations. While some difficulty in
confinning beneficial owner and controller would remain, the
responsibility for providing much of this data is already primarily a public
sector duty.
Tuming all responsibilities for monitoring and identifying suspicious
transactions to financial intelligence units would also eliminate the need for
the private sector to develop expe1iise in those areas. It would also
eliminate the need for the public sector to provide any assistance in
designing such systems or to supervise their implementation.
In order for financial intelligence units to complete operational
analysis, however, it would also be necessary for the private sector to
convey to them infonnation on client profiles. While identification and
transaction records are relatively simple to detennine and maintain,
profiling is a far more subjective requirement. However, this is due to the
fact that what constitutes non-criminal or nonnative transactions is not
spelled out in clear detail. In themy it might be possible to define such a
data field with greater accuracy.
Another problem is the failure of both private sector persons and
financial intelligence units to use empirically and statistically-based
analysis. Cunently the private sector does not have the incentive or the
infonnation necessmy to do so. The public sector also does not have access
to all the p1ivate sector-held customer profiling and transaction data that
constitutes many of the relevant independent vmiables. This problem may
be obviated if financial intelligence w1its were tasked with using scientific
methods of regression or discriminant analysis and if they had access to the
data currently not reported to them by the private sector. Once a
scientifically-derived algorithm is detennined, financial intelligence units
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could complete operational analysis and create reports for immediate
refenal to investigators. They could determine the most important
parameters, such as likelihood of catching significant criminal proceeds or
tenorism financing. Additional benefits of such a system would be
avoiding the problems inherent in non-fact based profiling and in turning
over to the private sector the secret list of indicators that trigger money
laundering and teiTorism financing investigations by the public sector.
As will be seen in Part II, keeping these responsibilities in the public
sector is essentially the path taken by most tax administrations, thus
allowing amalgamation of data from all private sector reporting persons
with other confidential data accessible only by the public sector, and
permitting the use of statistical analysis to select taxpayers and returns for
audit.
There are a few disadvantages to making the system public. First,
there could be public opposition based on fears of turning so much private
financial data over to a governmental organization. In 1999, privacy
concerns were key in defeating a proposed regulation 235 that would have
implemented customer identification, account monitoring, and suspicious
transaction reporting in the United States, although there was as much
concern with banks holding such information with transaction reporting to
FinCEN. 236 However, following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001
these requirements were spelled out in the USA PATRIOT ACT, which
passed easily, 237 and there have been few if any significant complaints
voiced in the U.S. Congress since then about such requirements. Turning
more financial transaction information over to a govenunental agency may
spark additional privacy concerns, both in the United States and elsewhere.
However, a privacy advantage to such a system would be that private
financial institutions and DNFBP would no longer be required to monitor
accounts. Additional concems could be addressed by strengthening, where
needed, of data protection mles at financial intelligence units. While tax
administrations have access to far less data than would financial
intelligence units under such a system, there has been little complaint
expressed about privacy concerns in the tax area.
235. Know Your Customer, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,524 (proposed Dec. 7, 1998) (withdrawn Mar. 23,
1999).
236. Oliver Ireland & Rachel Howell, The Fear Factor: Privacy, Fear, and the Changing
Hegemony of the American People and the Right to Privacy, 29 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REo. 671,67780 (2004). While a senior staff member of the International Monetary Fund the author of this Article
visited the Chief of Staff of an influential Senate Banking Committee member who assured the author
that the purpose of the rule was to help the government identify clients who owned guns lay the
groundwork for their confiscation.
237. ld. at 683.
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Another disadvantage is that public sector costs would be higher,
which canies political costs. However, because there would be no
redundancy among the many private parties who now must develop and
implement their own systems for client monitoring there should be a
significant overall savings in total implementation costs. Also, there would
likely be significant political suppmi from the fmancial sector, which
would see significant savings, and also from civil servants who work for
financial intelligence units, who would see work load, including budget
support, increase significantly. It might even be possible to raise financing
through a financial institution user fee. 238 Because the preventive measures
system includes not only money launde1ing but tenorism financing, it may
be easier politically to increase public funding than it would be for other
programs.
II. FAILURES AND SUCCESSES IN SELECTING INCOME TAX
RETURNS FOR AUDIT
A. System Overview

As it tums out, certain tax administrations select tax returns for audit
in a manner analogous to some of the proposals suggested above for
reforming the system of preventive measures. If they can work for income
tax they could also work for anti-money laundering and terrorism
financing.
Unlike the anti-money laundering system, there is no single global
standard for the design and implementation of tax administrations. 239 That
being said, a number of tax authorities from advanced counhies, including
the United States, have developed administrative systems that share many
features. A key function of these systems is to improve compliance with
revenue laws. While there are many facets to compliance, taxpayer audits
are a critical component. 240 h1 the course of an audit, tax administrations
examine a pmiicular taxpayer to determine whether that taxpayer has

238. Not surprisingly, public sector unions concerning are typically opposed to growth and
aggrandizement of private sector policing. Stephen Schneider, Privatizing Economic Crime
El?{orcement: Exploring the Role of Private Sector investigative Agencies i11 Combating lt1oney
Laundering, 16 PoLIClNG & Soc. 285, 304 (2006). This would reverse the process.
239. While the FA TF 40 Recommendations and IX Special Recommendations are widely accepted
as a global standard, some features of income tax administration are becoming something like global
standards. See Gordon, On the Use and Abuse of Standards for Law, supra note 15, at 584-87, 588-89.
240. OECD, COMPLIANCE RISK MANAGEMENT: AUDIT CASE SELECTION SYSTEMS 5 (2004),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecdf44/36/33818568.pdf [hereinafter OECD, COMPLIANCE RISK
MANAGEMENT].
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complied with her or his obligations lmder the law.24! A key facet of a tax
administration's audit program is the selection of persons for audit. 242 This
Part draws an analogy between the selection of individual income
taxpayers for audit by tax administrations and the selection of customers of
persons subject to preventive measures for investigation by fmancial
intelligence units.
As discussed in Part I of this Article, the implementation of private
sector preventive measures for money laundering and terrorism financing
involve two groups.
The first consists of private sector financial
institutions and DNFBP who must examine and report on certain activities
of their clients. With respect to the tax audit function, however, the private
sector consists of two groups: third parties who file reports with the tax
authority concerning other taxpayers, and taxpayers themselves who file tax
declarations, known as 'returns' in the United States. As cunently
constituted private sector preventive measures require the private sector to
make judgments as to the likelihood that a particular customer has
committed money laundering or tenmism financing. Those who provide
third party information reporting do not have to make any similar
judgments. It is the tax administration that makes the decision whether to
audit a taxpayer, not the third party.
B. Role of the Private Sector
The income tax involves the computation of tax due based, in pmi, on
applying a tax rate to the net of taxable gross income and allowable
deductions. Therefore, key aspects of income tax administration include
ensuring that all taxable gross income is included and that only allowable
deductions are subtracted, and· that the proper tax rate is applied _to this net.
Not surprisingly, income tax administration focuses to a large extent on
these items of inclusion and deduction. Third party information returns also
tend to focus on these items, particularly items of income.
Third party information reporting is a common feature of developed
country tax systems. 243 As with infonnation reporting by persons subject to
preventive measures for money laundering and tenorism financing, third
parties are not compensated for their efforts, making the system another
example of an unfunded private mandate. 244 For example, in the United
States there is a wide array of third-party information reporting
241. !d. at 6.
242. !d. at 9.
243. Id at l 0-12.
244. Steven A. Dean, The Incomplete Global Market for Tax: Information, 49 B.C. L. REv. 605,
6!2-!3 (2008) [hereinafter Dean, The Incomplete Global lvfarket].
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requirements. 245 U.S. payers of wages, interest, or dividend income must
repmi those payments, while brokers must repmi the amounts realized from
246
securities sales.
As is the case with financial institutions and DNFBP, third party
repmiers are subject to sanctions for failure to implement their duties. 247
However, unlike the suspicious transaction reporting system, which
requires extensive decision-making in the context of a highly subjective
system, the third party reporting system is highly objective. All that is
required of the third party repmier is to identify the taxpayer, the payment
to the taxpayer, and repmi both to the tax authority. 248 There are
uncompensated costs associated with such requirements. However, the
requirements are relatively straightforward, and third party reporters
quickly develop expertise with respect to distilling and disseminating this
infonnation?49 In a manner similar to systems whereby some countries
require the automatic reporting of cross-border transactions to fmancial
intelligence units, third party repmiing can be easily automated, often by
contracting with data management specialists. 250 While taxpayers are also
required to report income and deductions and are subject to sanctions for
failure to repmi or for reporting incorrectly, they have a direct interest in
fashioning their declarations to minimize their liability; taxpayer sanctions
are designed in part to counteract this incentive effect. 251 However, third
party repmiers have very little direct incentive to misreport in the face of
.
25?
poss1'bl e sanctiOns.
Finally, unlike with the preventive measures system, the private sector
plays no other role in the audit selection system. All analytical tasks,
including design and implementation, are assigned to the public sector.

245. I.R.C. §§ 6050A-6050V (201 0)
246. I.R.C. §§ 6041-42 (2010).
247. I.R.C. §§ 6652 (2010).
248. See, e.g., J.R.S. Form W-4 (wages) and I.R.S. Form 1099-Int (interest). There are some
exceptions to this general rule. For example, in the United States an employee need not report
reimbursements and deduct expenditures for travel and entertainment if the employer's policy tracks the
requirements of the Regulations. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1 (as amended in 1993). In effect, the tax law is
applied and enforced by the employer.
249. See Jay A. Soled, Homage to Information Returns, 27 VA. TAX REV. 371,373-76 (2007).
250. See, e.g., Totally Paperless, http://www.totallypaperless.com/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
251. Sanjit Dhami & Ali al-Nowaihi, Why do people pay taxes? Prospect The01y Versus Expected
Utility The01y, 64 1. OF ECON. BEHAVlOR & 0RG. 171, 171-92 (2007) (discussing effects of penalties
on taxpayer compliance).
252. See William L. Burke, Tax Information Reporting and Compliance in the Cross-Border
Context, 27 VA. TA.X REv. 399, 400-01 (2007) (discussing misreporting in the context of third-party
estate tax reUU1ls).
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C. Role of the Public Sector

The tax administration authority has the sole responsibility to
determine which taxpayers should be audited. Unlike the private sector
(and quite possibly the public sector) in the preventive measures systems,
tax authorities have a specific goal in determining which taxpayers to audit:
they generally base their decisions on estimates of the degree of risk of
understatement of tax due multiplied by the size of the understatement. 253
In order to implement such a goal, tax administrations may use a number of
teclmiques. These can include matching third party infonnation with that
provided by the taxpayer in a tax declaration, data-mining with algorithms
such as discriminant or regression analysis, and "red flag" analysis. One
would expect details about audit selection strategies to be a well-kept
secret, otherwise taxpayers would have a roadmap of how to avoid an
audit. 254
The first technique for deciding which retums to audit is third party
infmmation return data matching, which is an exception to the "well-kept
secret" mle. This is such an effective technique that in the United States,
whenever there is a discrepancy (above a ce1iain threshold) between
infonnation provided in a self-reported tax retum information and the
information repmied by third parties, the Internal Revenue Service of the
U.S. automatically sends a notice that taxes are due without bothering to go
2-through the audit process first. )) The Internal Revenue Service has
augmented its data-matching by deriving useful additional material from
sources other than third-party reporters. 256 In fact, it is because taxpayers
are aware that the govemment is receiving third-party infonnation that they
are far less likely to try and cheat with respect to items subject to such
.
257
reportmg.

253. See information on the U.S., U.K., and France, OECD, Compliance Risk Management, supra
note 240, at 14-15, 33-34, 45. "The IRS has been traditionally focused on the magnitude of potential
audit adjustments." Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the
Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569, 583-84 (2006).
254. Raskolnikov, supra note 253, at 583.
255. Jeffrey A. Dubin, Michael A. Graetz, & Louis L. Wilde, The Changing Face of Tax
Er!lorcement, 1978-1988, 43 TAX LAW. 893, 90! (1989-1990) [hereinafter Dubin eta!., The Changing
Face].
256. For example, data on dependents (which can result in deductions from income) are obtained
from various government sources. See Nina E. Olson, Closing the Ta~ Gap: Minding the Gap: A TenStep Program For Better Tar Compliance, 20 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV 7, 8 (2009).
257. Leandra Ledennan, Statutor)' Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tm: Compliance,
60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 697 (2007); James Aim, John Deskins & Michael McKee, Third-Party Income
Reporting and Income Tm Compliance 2-3 (Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Working Paper
No. 06-35, 2006), available at http://aysps.gsu.edu/publications/2006/index.htm.
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The next teclmique is the use of algorithms such as discriminant or
regression analysis, the gold standard for detennining the statistical
relationship between dependent and independent vmiables and one not used
by any party in the preventive measures system. The Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development has identified the United States
and the United Kingdom as using such systems. 258 The U.S. system uses a
discriminant function analysis. 259 According to the Intemal Revenue
Service, a Discriminm1t Function System ("DIF") score rates each taxpayer
retum for the potential for change, based on past IRS experience with
similar retums. In particular, an: Unreported Income DIF ("UIDIF") score
rates the reh1m for the potential of umeported income. Intemal Revenue
Service personnel then screen the highest-scoring retums, "selecting some
for audit and identifying the items on these retums that are most likely to
need review." 260 While the Internal Revenue Service has admitted to using
such a system, the process of the analysis is "one of the best kept secrets in
govemment." 261 Prior to the institution of the DIF system, about half of all
Intemal Revenue Service audits resulted in no tax change; afterward only
one-fifth showed no change (although this fact gives no indication of the
change in magnih1de of the additional taxes recovered). 262
Because the govemment enforces strict secrecy over the details of the
DIF system, some speculation is required as to the true nature of the
program. In order to design a discriminate function, one must fn·st
fommlate a hypothesis about the relationship between dependent variable
(risk of understatement of tax or income multiplied by size of
understatement) and possible independent variables; in order to test that
hypothesis sufficient data must first be collected. Begi1ming in 1963, such
data was collected through the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement
Program, whereby the Intemal Revenue Service undertook thorough audits
of representative samples of individual income tax retums approximately
263
every three years.
This program of data collection was abandoned
because of the burden placed on those taxpayers who had the bad luck to be
selected for audit/ 64 but it has been replaced with National Research
258. OECD, COMPLJANCE RJSK MANAGEMENT, supra note 240, at 14-15, 34-35.
259. IRS, The Examination (Audil) Process (2006), http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/O,id
=151888,00.html [hereinafter IRS, Examination (Audit) Process].
260. !d.
261. Dubin eta/., The Changing Face, supra note 255, at 900.
262. Robert E. Brown & Mark J. Mazur, The National Research Program: Measuring Taxpayer
Compliance Comprehensively, 51 KAN. L. REV. 1255, 1261-62 (2003) [hereinafter Brown & Mazur,
The National Research Program].
263. !d. at 1261-62.
264. !d. at 1263.
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Program, a data collection program that relies on audit information as well
as added data obtained from vmious confidential government sources and
public records (e.g., current and prior addresses, real estate holdings,
business registrations, and corporate records). 265 Obviously, while limited,
this system is far more scientific than that used either by the private or
public sector in implementing suspicious activity reporting and referral of
cases for investigation.
While the discriminate function is a secret, it appears that the number
of independent variables is limited. At least in pmi for this reason, the
Internal Revenue Service does not rely solely on discriminant function
analysis to select retums for audit. Like financial institutions and DNFBP,
the Internal Revenue Service, as well as many other developed countly tax
administrations, 266 uses more subjective "red flag" types of reviews. 267
While one can assume these are based on experience, one can also assume
that they are more imprecise than the more scientific discriminant function
analysis. 268
Apparently in order to make red flag application more standardized
and automated, the Internal Revenue Service has developed the Dependent
Data-based System. This is a risk identification system powered by mles
with each rule identifying "non-compliant indicators" (i.e. red tlags); if the
rule conditions are met the rule "fires." Each fired rule receives points
based on established scming methodologies. By 2004, only a few mles
have been included, but the Internal Revenue Service stated that it was
working to expand the number. 269 The U.S. also uses other far more general
criteria to determine audits.
Given the opportlmity to collect more underpaid taxes from fewer
audits, in advanced jurisdictions like the United States tax authorities audit
265. IRS, REDUCfNG THE FEDERAL TAX GAP: A REPORT ON IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPUANCE
7 (2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/tax_gap _report_final_ 080207_linked.pdf;
Brown & Mazur, The National Research Program, supra note 262, al 1264-86; Nina E. Olson, supra
note 256, at 9.
266. Including Canada, the U.K. and France. OECD, COMPLIANCE RISK MANAGEMENT, supra note
240, at 25-26, 34-35, 45.
267. Raslcolnilcov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation, supra note 253, at 587-94.
268. An indication of "red flags" are items required in Schedule M-1 which requires the corporate
taxpayer to reconcile its financial accounting income with the income it reports on its tax return. Some
of the information required is general; other detailed. The partnership version of Schedule M-1 does not
even require the disclosure of book-tax differences. !d. at 585. "Even less infom1ation is required of an
unincorporated sole proprietor on Schedule C to Fonn 1040." Ronald A. Pearlman, Demystijj,ing
Disclosure: First Steps, 55 TAX L. REV. 289, 296 (2002). Interestingly, this data is not filed by third
parties, so there is a direct incentive by the taxpayer to misstate. However, apparently the combination
of incentive to cheat against disincentives from sanctions is sufficient that the I.R.S. still picks up
significant useful information for its red flags strategy.
269. OECD, COMPLIANCE RISK MANAGEMENT, supra note 240, at 15-l7.
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returns of higher income persons more often than those of lower income.
Also, individuals with wage income only, which is subject to third party
information reporting, and who do not itemize deductions are also audited
at a lower rate. 270 This system appears to be far more objective and efficient
than the more subjective red flag systems used by both financial institutions
and DNFBP and financial intelligence units to spot suspicious transactions.
It is unknown exactly why the Internal Revenue Service has not
expanded its discriminant function system to include more independent
variables, but it may have something to do with the additional expense
involved and the lack of suppmi for additional funding for the Internal
Revenue Service. 271
D. Summary and Conclusions
Because the income tax audit system requires private sector entities to
repmi only objective information that can be transmitted electronically, it
has a significant advantage over the preventive measures reporting system,
suppmiing the proposition that such an "objective infonnation" mle be
exporied to that system. By turning all analytical tasks over to the public
sector, there is no need for the private sector to design or implement a
selection system. This has the benefits of eliminating the need for the
private sector to develop expe1iise in tax administration and audit selection.
It also eliminates the need for the public sector to provide any assistance in
designing such systems, or to supervise their implementation. It also
eliminates vi1tually all negative p1ivate sector incentive effects, including
those relating to implementation and non-fact based profiling. Finally, there
is no inherent contradiction between developing an effective system for
audit selection and keeping such a system out of the hands of possible tax
cheats: no private sector person is involved in audit selection.
By truning all information and analytical responsibilities to the public
sector, which is the sole repository of expe1iise on non-compliance, it is
possible for tax administrations to develop a scientifically-based system of
audit selection. Instead of relying solely on even educated guesses, the
discriminant function system gum·antees a higher level of con-elation
between dependent and suspected independent variables of tax noncompliance. This reduces the need for red flag based selection. However,
by placing both all expertise and red flag based activities in one entity,
greater quality and greater consistency are likely than they would be if split

270. Raskolnilcov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation, supra note 253, at 583-84.
271. Confidential Interview, I.R.S. District Director, in Cambridge, Mass. (May I, 1994).

562

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE

& fNTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol21:503

into many entities. This is clearly an advantage over the preventive
measures system.
Another major advantage is that the statistically-based techniques used
to select returns for audit are kept as secret as possible fi·om the public,
making it harder for the private sector to develop techniques that would
avoid triggering an audit. One disadvantage is that public sector costs are
higher than they would be if additional duties were turned to the private
sector.
III. PROPOSAL FOR A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR PREVENTIVE
MEASURES FOR MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORISM
FINANCING
Based on the above analysis, a rethought system of preventive
measures for money laundering and tenorism financing would radically
shift the burden from private entities to one public entity. By requiting
financial institutions and DNFBP to design and implement requirements
that are poorly described, expensive, and unfunded, the FATF
Recommendations invite failure. Given that the private sector's main
motive is profit, one would reasonably predict that it would seek to reduce
costs by spending as little as possible on implementing those requirements.
Because of the Recommendations' subjective nature, it is possible for the
p1ivate sector to define downward its duties without fear of sanction. In
addition, the requirements describe a mandate that the plivate sector has
little objective capacity to implement, even if it wanted to.
A rethought system would eliminate all but the most objective and
least expensive unfunded private sector mandates. Specifically, private
sector persons cunently tasked with client identification, profiling, recordkeeping, monitoring, and suspicious transaction reporting would be
required to perfonn only the first two tasks. Added to this would be a
requirement to transmit certain profiling infonnation and all financial
transactions. Client profiling information, however, would be strictly
defined; a limited number of data fields would be spelled out by the
financial intelligence unit. Transaction data would include all client
transactions of any kind, domestic or international, perhaps in excess of a
certain de minimis limit. All data would, where possible, be transmitted
electronically.
All other aspects of the preventive measures system would be
allocated to the government. This would eliminate the cunent privatesector cost-savings disincentive effects in the cunent system. The current
system requires the govenunent to examine repmis from the private sector
and detennine which of those reports should be fmiher investigated; in
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effect, to detennine which "suspicious" repmis are really susp1c10us.
Dividing the search for the suspicious and the really suspicious betvveen the
p1ivate sector and public financial intelligence units seems inherently
inefficient. Because the government has far greater access to impmiant
data, it would also vastly increase the capacity of the system to design and
implement an effective system for identifying likely criminals and
tenmists.
Specifically, financial intelligence units would be tasked with
analyzing data and determining which clients and transactions should be
investigated for possible laundering or terrorism financing. They would
also be required to determine what their specific goals were in doing so.
With respect to laundering, this would be the probability of laundering
multiplied by magnitude of laundering. With respect to tenmism finance,
this could be the probability of financing or some formula of probability
multiplied by the potential danger that such financing might cause. As is
now the case, financial intelligence units would be required to send such
repmis on to law enforcement for investigation. Strict data protection and
secrecy laws would continue to apply to the financial intelligence unit.
Financial intelligence units would continue to have access to other
sources of information as now. They would also perfonn standard link
analysis, as they do now. However, they would also be tasked with testing
and improving various hypotheses regarding the relationship between
independent variables (for example, probability of laundering multiplied by
magnitude of laundering; probability of terrorism financing multiplied by
potential danger of financing) and possible dependent variables, many of
which are now "red flags." They would use regression or discriminant
function analysis. Because of the resources and time required for such
empirical and statistical analysis, this would be an ongoing project, with
additional factors added as research was completed. Because of this,
financial intelligence tmits would continue to use red flag analysis.
However, where possible they would automate such analytical work by
using mle-based programs such as the Intemal Revenue Service's
Dependent Data-based System. All infonnation conceming data analysis
and would be kept strictly secret from the public, including financial
institutions and DNFBP.
Some problems could still persist. Government bureaucracies are often
inefficient, and financial intelligence units may have difficulty
implementing their expanded roles. There may also be political pushback
because of the greater costs to the public sector budget, or because of a
perception that the govemment's greater authority could be a threat to
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individual freedom. But the improvements in catching criminals and
terrorists in a rethought system should outweigh these potential downsides.
CONCLUSION
The current system designed to prevent money laundering and
terrorism financing does not work well. It is based on a faulty theoretical
constmction. The FATF Recommendations require financial institutions to
design and implement requirements to monitor client transactions and
report those that raise suspicion of money laundering or tenorism
financing. However, because these requirements are poorly described,
expensive, and unfunded, the FATF Recommendations invite failure.
Because of their subjective nature, it is possible for the private sector to
define downward its costly duties without fear of sanction. In addition,
private sector financial institutions do not have sufficient expertise or data
to design and implement such systems even if they wished to
The current system also requires the government to examine reports
from the private sector and determine which of those reports should be
fhrther investigated; in effect, to determine which "suspicious" repmis are
really suspicious. Dividing these tasks between the private sector and
public financial intelligence units is inefficient. Not only does it separate
data pools into many different private sector parties and the public sector, it
reduces the overall role of the public sector in doing what it should do best:
fmding criminals and ten·orists. It also makes the use of empirically based
analytical tools like regression or discriminant function analysis both
difficult (by dividing data bases) and unlikely (because the private sector
has few incentives to spend the money to do so). Finally, it introduces an
inherent contradiction: the public sector is tasked with infon11ing the
private sector how best to detect launderers and tenorists, but to do so
could act as a road map on how to avoid detection should such infon11ation
fall into the wrong hands.
These problems can be addressed by h1ming all analytical work to
public sector financial intelligence units and reserving for the private sector
only the reporting of certain client profiling data and records of all financial
transactions. Financial intelligence should be required to use, to the extent
possible, empirical analysis, results should be far better than the cunent
system. While such a system would be substantially different from the
current one, there is considerable precedent in the way in which tax
administrations select taxpayers for audit investigation. Also, there should
be significant overall cost savings as redundancies among multiple private
sector party analytical duties are eliminated. Both the private sector, which
would experience significant cost reductions, and public sector civil
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servants, who would see an increase in duties and fmancial support, would
be expected to support such changes. While these changes would entail a
larger cost to the public treasmy, because this would in part finance greater
governmental anti-terrorism work, the added public sector costs might be
politically acceptable.

